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THE WORLD ACCORDING TO, AND AFTER, 
MCCUTCHEON V. FEC, AND WHY IT MATTERS  
Liz Kennedy & Seth Katsuya Endo∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The editors of the Valparaiso Law Review had the good sense to 
hold their symposium conference “Money in Politics:  The Good, the 
Bad, and the Ugly” the week the Supreme Court issued its decision in 
McCutcheon v. FEC.  At the Symposium, one of the authors of this Article, 
Liz Kennedy, presented a talk entitled, “The Supreme Court, the 
Constitution, and the Crisis of Confidence in American Democracy,” 
which explained how the Roberts Court has misunderstood the 
democratic interests at stake in its recent campaign finance cases. The 
Roberts Court has applied a blinded, highly abstract First Amendment 
doctrine that ignores the distortion of democratic responsiveness caused 
by big money in politics; current anti-majoritarian policy outcomes 
demonstrate the lack of meaningful representation experienced by the 
non-wealthy. This type of endemic political inequality constitutes a 
corruption of democracy because a democratic system of government is 
one in which elected officials are responsive to the views of each citizen 
considered as political equals.  Accordingly, to the extent that the First 
Amendment is understood to be in service to democracy, it cannot be 
read as permitting a small, wealthy minority to accrue political power 
deriving from their wealth—that, after all, is the definition of a 
plutocracy. 
This Article expands upon the presentation, further describing the 
jurisprudential and policy mistakes made by the controlling plurality in 
McCutcheon, including its inconsistency with important precedent.  
Specifically, Part II describes McCutcheon’s plurality holding and its 
direct practical effects on campaign fundraising.1  Part III explains why 
the expected influx of additional money into politics will exacerbate 
                                                 
∗ At the time of the drafting of this Article, the authors were colleagues at Demos, a 
public policy organization dedicated to ensuring an equal chance in our economy and an 
equal say in our democracy. This Article, however, reflects the viewpoints of the authors 
and does not necessarily reflect the positions of Demos.  Liz is Counsel at Demos, and was 
formerly Counsel at the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, an associate at 
Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, and a Senior Associate representing unions in labor and 
industrial bankruptcy cases.  She received her J.D. cum laude from N.Y.U. School of Law. 
Seth received his J.D. from N.Y.U. School of Law in 2007. In addition to working in private 
practice, he has clerked for several federal and state judges.  For more pieces from the 
symposium, see Valparaiso University Law School Symposium:  Money in Politics:  The Good, the 
Bad, and the Ugly, 49 VAL. U. L. REV. (2015). 
1 See infra Part II (discussing the McCutcheon decision). 
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democratic harms that already damage our republic.2  Part IV considers 
McCutcheon’s place in the Court’s prior jurisprudence in this area.3  Part 
V discusses the path towards the democracy we deserve.4  Finally, Part 
VI concludes by reiterating the movement towards a pro-democracy 
understanding of the Constitution.5 
II.  WHAT DID THE MCCUTCHEON DECISION DO? 
Part II describes McCutcheon’s plurality holding and its direct 
practical effects on campaign fundraising. It describes how McCutcheon 
struck down the aggregate federal contribution limits and discusses how 
striking down these limits allows the wealthy to spend even more 
money to influence political decisions. 
A. McCutcheon Strikes Down the Aggregate Federal Contribution Limits 
In McCutcheon v. FEC, the Supreme Court in a five-to-four vote, 
declared the aggregate federal limits on the amounts a wealthy 
individual can contribute overall to candidates, parties, and committees 
unconstitutional.6  Alone at one end, Justice Thomas would have 
completely overruled Buckley v. Valeo, tossing aside the legal distinction 
it had drawn between contributions and expenditures in favor of a 
uniform strict-scrutiny standard.7  Writing for a four-justice plurality, 
Chief Justice Roberts applied a “rigorous” review of the statute, 
assessing whether it avoided “unnecessary abridgement” of an 
individual’s First Amendment free-speech rights.8  He explained that the 
plurality assumed, without deciding, that this intermediate level of 
scrutiny applied because it neither changed the outcome nor required 
overruling precedent.9  Chief Justice Roberts asserted that only the 
government’s interest in the prevention of corruption, or the appearance 
                                                 
2 See infra Part III (explaining the harmful effects of money in politics). 
3 See infra Part IV (considering the McCutcheon decision in the Court’s prior rulings). 
4 See infra Part V (examining the future effects of the McCutcheon decision). 
5 See infra Part VI (concluding the Article). 
6 See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462 (2014) (discussing the aggregate 
contribution limits at 2 U.S.C. § 441a(3) and holding that aggregate limits on contributions 
intrude on First Amendment rights). 
7 See id. at 1464 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 
(“BCRA”) aggregate limits should be subjected to strict scrutiny). 
8 Id. at 1444. 
9 See id. at 1445–46 (concluding that the aggregate limit in place under Federal Election 
Campaign Act (“FECA”) does not control); see also McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 
2530 (2014) (“The [Supreme] Court does sometimes assume, without deciding, that a law is 
subject to a less stringent level of scrutiny.”). 
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thereof, could legitimately support a restriction on contribution limits.10  
He then defined “corruption” solely as the direct exchange of money for 
an official act.11  In articulating this definition, he affirmatively stated 
that quid pro quo corruption does not encompass implicit exchanges of 
influence and access for contributions.12  Given this definition, Chief 
Justice Roberts reasoned that aggregate limits could only be sustained if 
they prevented circumvention of the individual base limits, which bar 
individuals from directly contributing unlimited sums to specific 
candidates, parties, and committees.13  Applying this stringent standard 
and narrowed definition of corruption, Chief Justice Roberts found that 
the aggregate contribution limits violated the First Amendment rights of 
the plaintiff.14 
B. Striking the Federal Aggregate Contribution Limits Allows the Wealthy to 
Spend Even More Money to Influence Political Decisions 
The federal aggregate contribution limits struck down in McCutcheon 
had prohibited any one individual from donating in excess of $123,200 
over a two-year period to all candidates for federal office, as well as 
political action and party committees.15  For perspective, in 2012, the 
median family income in the United States was $51,017.16  A typical 
American family contributing its entire pre-tax income for two years 
would still be incapable of reaching this limit.17  Even an individual with 
an income of $191,156—a figure within the top five percent of income for 
the country in 2012—and with no other expenses would struggle to 
contribute the maximum amount after taxes.18 
                                                 
10 See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1450 (“The [Supreme] Court has identified only one 
legitimate governmental interest for restricting campaign finances:  preventing corruption 
of the appearance of corruption.”). 
11 See id. at 1441, 1450–51 (defining this exchange as “quid pro quo” corruption). 
12 See id. at 1451 (referencing Justice Stevens’ statement “that [the Supreme Court] ha[s] 
not always spoken about corruption in a clear or consistent voice”). 
13 See id. at 1446 (noting that legislative additions and the introduction of a 
comprehensive regulatory scheme strengthened statutory safeguards). 
14 Id. at 1462. 
15 Id. at 1442–43. 
16 Carmen DeNavas-Walt et al., Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the 
United States:  2012, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 5 (Sept. 2013), http://www.census.gov/prod/ 
2013pubs/p60-245.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6MND-56M6. 
17 See Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, The Democracy We Left Behind in Greece and McCutcheon, 89 
N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 112, 117 (2014), http://www.nyulawreview.org/sites/default/ 
files/ pdf/nyulawreviewonline-89-112-torres-spelliscy_0.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
S7XG-XW74 [hereinafter The Democracy We Left Behind] (noting that the laws at issue in 
McCutcheon only applied to the richest Americans). 
18 Id.; Marge Baker, The McCutcheon Decision:  Great for the Super-Rich, Bad for Everyone 
Else, HUFF. POST:  POLITICS (Apr. 3, 2014, 11:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
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Furthermore, in 2012, only 1219 individuals neared, reached, or 
exceeded the aggregate limit reviewed in the Supreme Court’s 
McCutcheon decision, which illuminated the rarefied air in which the 
aggregate limits operate.19  These select individuals comprise fewer than 
0.0004% of our country’s population.20  Yet, this miniscule number of 
elite donors contributed more than $155.2 million to candidates, party 
committees, and political action committees.21  It has been estimated that, 
without the aggregate limit, these donors would have contributed at 
least another $300 million, for a total of $459.3 million.22  This figure 
dwarfs the $313 million that President Obama and Governor Romney 
raised together from at least 3.7 million small donors during their 2012 
presidential campaigns.23  Because of McCutcheon, those elite donors now 
may lawfully contribute more than $3.5 million to each major party and 
their candidates per election cycle.24  In total, the removal of the 
aggregate limits is expected to result in an additional $1 billion in 
campaign contributions over the next six years.25 
Partly explaining the expected increase, candidates and parties have 
a new vehicle with which to raise large amounts of funds—joint 
fundraising committees.26  Despite Chief Justice Roberts’s skepticism that 
                                                                                                             
marge-baker/the-mccutcheon-decision-g_b_5084787.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
5X74-9VRN. 
19 See Adam Lioz & Blair Bowie,  Policy Brief: McCutcheon Money:  The Projected Impact of 
Striking Aggregate Contribution Limits, DEMOS 2 (2013), http://www.demos.org/sites/ 
default/files/publications/McCutcheonMoney-2013.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
NN4D-9Y5F [hereinafter McCutcheon Money] (recognizing that a small group of donors 
make substantial contributions to candidates, parties, and political action committees). 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 See id. at 1 (explaining the effects the decision in McCutcheon had on campaign 
contributions). 
25 McCutcheon Money, supra note 19, at 1; see Adam Bonica & Jenny Shen, The Rich Are 
Dominating Campaigns.  Here’s Why That’s About to Get Worse, WASH. POST (Apr. 23, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/04/23/the-rich-are-
dominating-campaigns-heres-why-thats-about-to-get-worse/, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
WQR5-JMA (predicting large growth in contributions post-McCutcheon based on rise in 
contributions post-BCRA increase); Matea Gold, Wealthy Political Donors Seize on New 
Latitude to Give to Unlimited Candidates, WASH. POST (Sept. 2, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/wealthy-political-donors-seize-on-new-
latitude-to-give-to-unlimited-candidates/2014/09/01/d94aeefa-2f8c-11e4-bb9b-997ae96fad 
33_story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/G9DL-SNS7 [hereinafter Wealthy Political 
Donors] (“Together, 310 donors gave a combined $11.6 million more by this summer than 
would have been allowed before the ruling.”). 
26  See Paul Blumenthal, McCutcheon v. FEC’s Other Threat:  Case Should Super-Size Joint 
Fundraising Committees, HUFF. POST:  POLITICS (Oct. 7, 2013, 2:28 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/07/mccutcheon-joint-fundraising-committees_ 
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candidates and parties would utilize joint fundraising committees to 
solicit large donations, less than two weeks after the McCutcheon 
decision, the Republican Party created a joint fundraising committee that 
allowed donors to contribute more than $97,000 in one check, about 
twenty percent more than the old limit.27  Just a few months later, several 
Senate Republicans banded together to create another joint fundraising 
committee that permits donors to contribute more than $150,000 in one 
check.28  In addition, the increase is due to donors’ inability to use the 
aggregate limit as an excuse to avoid contributing to officeholders’ 
campaigns when solicited.29  Already, there are reports of lobbyists 
contributing much more than the former maximum of $123,200 as a 
result of this pressure.30 
As for other current practical effects of the decision, Chief Justice 
Roberts and various commentators suggest that the silver lining of 
McCutcheon is the possibility of money migrating from undisclosed or 
less controlled channels back to the parties and other regulated political 
committees that disclose the source of their political funds.31  However, 
this hypothesis relies on the assumption that the rule change will merely 
                                                                                                             
n_4057547.html, archived at http://perma.cc/C9L4-NXLU (using a chart to depict joint 
fundraising committee growth between 1994–2012). 
27 Paul Blumenthal, Republicans Launch First 'Super Committee' to Rake in Post-
McCutcheon Money, HUFF. POST:  POLITICS (Apr. 11, 2014, 2:56 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/04/11/mccutcheon-gop_n_5134246.html, archived 
at http://perma.cc/TXG8-TH39. 
28  Byron Tau, GOP Launches New Big Money Effort, POLITICO (Aug. 5, 2014, 11:23 AM), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/08/republicans-targeted-state-victory-fundraising-
109724.html, archived at http://perma.cc/AS5Y-BBB8 (“[R]epublicans are launching a 
fundraising effort that will let donors cut six-figures checks to support GOP Senate 
candidates.”). 
29  See Adam Lioz & Blair Bowie, Policy Brief, McCutcheon Methodology, DEMOS (2013), 
http://www.demos.org/publication/mccutcheon-methodology, archived at 
http://perma.cc/W52F-FPRD [hereinafter McCutcheon Methodology] (discussing data sets 
of campaign contributions by elite donors). 
30 Kate Ackley, Mini-Mega Donors Dominate Downtown Giving:  K Street, ROLL CALL (July 
29, 2014, 2:39 PM), http://blogs.rollcall.com/beltway-insiders/k-street-files-mini-mega-
donors-dominate-downtown-giving/, archived at http://perma.cc/T2WZ-K3NF 
(commenting that “elite mini-mega donors have blown” past the maximum contribution 
limitation that the Supreme Court struck down in McCutcheon). 
31 See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1460 (2014) (reasoning that with modern 
technology disclosure will now offer an effective means of providing the voting public with 
information); see also Nathanial Persily, Bringing Big Money out of the Shadows, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/03/opinion/bringing-big-money-out-
of-the-shadows.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/RSQ5-RH95 (asserting that because 
the court “reaffirms the value of forcing disclosure of contributions to candidates[,]” it will 
bring to light where the money is coming from and where it will go). 
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shift the total amount spent—not increase it.32  First, this assumption is 
probably weak because a group of donors—such as the lobbyists 
described above—will contribute more because of their relationships 
with individual candidates.33  Second, until certain avenues are shut 
down, there presumably will be donors who continue to utilize channels 
that allow them to keep their identities hidden from public view.34  
Specific groups were purposely created to maintain donor secrecy and 
advertise it as a selling point to their prospective funders.35  In addition, 
some of these groups are part of networks that shift funds between 
affiliated organizations to hide the source of the funds.36 
III.  WHY DOES ALLOWING THE USE OF MORE CONCENTRATED MONEY IN 
POLITICS MATTER? 
Part III explains why the expected influx of additional money into 
politics will exacerbate democratic harms that already damage our 
                                                 
32 See David Weigel, The Supreme Court Just Struck a Blow to Individual Campaign Donation 
Limits, and Conservatives Say It’ll Be Good for Transparency, SLATE (Apr. 2, 2014, 10:54 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/weigel/2014/04/02/the_supreme_court_just_gutted_indivi
dual_campaign_donation_limits_and_conservatives.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
82UN-GK2N (speculating it can be expected that more money will flow to candidates, 
political action committees, and parties as a result of the McCutcheon decision). 
33 See Ackley, supra note 30 (noting that “elite mini-mega” donors have blown past the 
maximum contribution limitation that the Supreme Court struck down in McCutcheon); see 
also Wealthy Political Donors, supra note 25 (“Together, 310 donors gave a combined $11.6 
million more by this summer than would have been allowed before the ruling.”). 
34 See Robert Maguire, Dark Money Hits $50 Million, Most Still to Come, OPEN SECRETS 
(Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2014/08/dark-money-hits-50-million-
most-still-to-come/, archived at http://perma.cc/9QD-MXUN (explaining that the vast 
majority of money that will be reported to the Federal Election Committee is still to come, 
but given recent trends, dark money (anonymous) spending will be the highest it has ever 
been). 
35 See Matea Gold, Koch-Backed Political Network, Built to Shield Donors, Raised $400 Million 
in 2012 Elections, WASH. POST (Jan. 5, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ 
koch-backed-political-network-built-to-shield-donors-raised-400-million-in-2012-elections/ 
2014/01/05/9e7cfd9a-719b-11e3-9389-09ef9944065e_story.html, archived at http://perma. 
cc/XD43-XSMH [hereinafter Koch-Backed] (describing a coalition that was “constructed 
with extensive legal barriers to shield its donors”); see also Brendan Fischer, Romney:  An 
"Investment" for the 1%?, PR WATCH (Sept. 24, 2012), http://www.prwatch. 
org/news/2012/09/11761/romney-and-investments-1, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
MM8A-9RBN (affirming that contributors to the Romney Campaign who “bundle” their 
contributions can have their identities remain secret). 
36 See Koch-Backed, supra note 35 (describing a coalition that was constructed with 
extensive legal barriers to shield its donors, and further explaining that it is important to 
donate without public disclosure to prevent personal attacks on donors); see also Fischer, 
supra note 35 (affirming that contributors to the Romney Campaign who “bundle” their 
contributions can have their identities remain secret and divulging that individuals 
anonymously contributed to candidate by forming “sham” corporations). 
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republic.  It discusses how increasing large contributors’ ability to use 
money in politics harms democratic self-government by permitting 
legislative capture by a wealthy minority, which has distinct, self-serving 
policy preferences.  Additionally, Part III describes how increasing large 
contributors’ ability to use money in politics leads to a crisis of 
confidence in the integrity of our democracy and why this is a 
constitutional concern. 
A. Increasing Large Contributors’ Ability to Use Money in Politics Harms 
Democratic Self-Government by Permitting Legislative Capture by a 
Wealthy Minority 
Campaign finance is intrinsically bound to the distribution of power 
within a democracy.37  And, thus, campaign finance litigation ultimately 
turns on fundamental theories of democracy and self-government.38  As 
one scholar states:  “Legal discourse on campaign finance reform often 
moves quickly to fundamental discussions within political theory.  
Positing some goal as the purpose of the First Amendment, both theorists 
and litigants deduce the content and priority of various rights claims 
according to their usefulness in advancing or respecting this goal.”39  
But, at the highest levels of abstraction, both proponents and opponents 
of campaign finance regulation describe their main concerns as being the 
sovereignty of the people and the responsiveness of elected officials to 
their constituents.40  For example, in McCutcheon, both Chief Justice 
                                                 
37 See Yasmin Dawood, Democracy, Power, and the Supreme Court:  Campaign Finance 
Reform in Comparative Context, 4 INT’L. J. CONST. L. 269, 270 (2006) (“[C]onflicts over 
campaign finance regulation are at base disputes about how power should be distributed 
within a democracy.”). 
38 Id.; see Deborah Hellman, Defining Corruption and Constitutionalizing Democracy, 111 
MICH. L. REV. 1385, 1402 (2013) (explaining that because no court has defined corruption to 
date, it “inescapably puts forward a conception of the proper role of a legislator in a 
democracy”); Spencer Overton, Judicial Modesty and the Lessons of McConnell v. FEC, 3 
ELECTION L.J. 305, 308 (2004) (“More than many other areas of the law, campaign finance 
regulation is laden with questions about political theory, partisan interests, and complex 
evidentiary records that involve political predictions.”); Lori Ringhand, Defining Democracy:  
The Supreme Court's Campaign Finance Dilemma, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 77, 77 (2004) (“Democratic 
self-government can be defined and structured in many different ways.”). 
39 Frank Pasquale, Reclaiming Egalitarianism in the Political Theory of Campaign Finance 
Reform, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 599, 621 (2008). 
40 See, e.g., James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, Distinguishing "Genuine" from "Sham’ in 
Grassroots Lobbying:  Protecting the Right to Petition During Elections, 29 CAMPBELL L. REV. 
353, 388–89 (2007) (“These incumbents are persons who have chosen to become (and seek 
reelection as) the people's representatives in a system where the people are sovereign and 
have guaranteed self-government rights of speech, association, and petition for the very 
purpose of maintaining the accountability of those representatives.”); see also Mark C. 
Alexander, Campaign Finance Reform:  Central Meaning and a New Approach, 60 WASH. & LEE 
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Roberts and Justice Breyer identify these interests as animating their 
opinions.41 
However, the problem with the position of Chief Justice Roberts and 
other opponents of campaign reform is that it ignores political reality.42  
In a representative democracy, “[i]f it is the people who are sovereign, 
then it is their preferences, . . .  that should be reflected in the positions of 
their representatives.”43  And there is a significant disjuncture between 
the preferences of the majority and federal legislative outputs, which 
instead reflect the policy preferences of the very wealthy—the group that 
dominates campaign contributions.44 That majoritarian policy 
                                                                                                             
L. REV. 767, 768 (2003) (commenting on this problem with campaign finance reform).  
Professor Alexander states: 
The states and federal government have responded to this problem 
with campaign finance reform, in order to reduce the power of money 
in politics, and to make candidates and elected officials more directly 
responsive to the people.  Campaign finance reform thus can protect 
the republican form of government upon which the nation was 
founded. 
Id. 
41 McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462 (2014).  Chief Justice Roberts opines: 
Representatives . . . can be expected to be cognizant of and responsive 
to those concerns.  Such responsiveness is key to the very concept of 
self-governance through elected officials . . . .  We have, however, held 
that this interest must be limited to a specific kind of corruption . . . in 
order to ensure that the Government's efforts do not have the effect of 
restricting the First Amendment right of citizens to choose who shall 
govern them. 
Id.; see id. at 1468 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing the government interests favoring 
campaign finance regulations as “rooted in the constitutional effort to create a democracy 
responsive to the people—a government where laws reflect the very thoughts, views, ideas, 
and sentiments, the expression of which the First Amendment protects”). 
42  See Eric Black, How Justice Roberts’ Campaign-Finance Ruling Ignores the Real World, 
MINN. POST (Apr. 4, 2014), http://www.minnpost.com/eric-black-ink/2014/04/how-
justice-roberts-campaign-finance-ruling-ignores-real-world, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
8RPV-8E9G (“Roberts’ description of the donor-candidate transactions the lead to millions 
and millions of dollars in campaign contributions bears little relationship to what happens 
in the real world in which well-heeled individuals and groups absolutely do buy 
influence . . . ”). 
43 Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 283, 320 
(2014). 
44 See MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE:  ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND 
POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA 13 (Princeton Univ. Press 2012) [hereinafter AFFLUENCE AND 
INFLUENCE] (“If the public . . . is reasonably competent in forming policy preferences, then 
the failure of government policy to reflect those preferences . . . imply a failure of a 
democratic governance.”); Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American 
Politics:  Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POLS. 564, 573–74 (2014) 
(reasoning that the wealthiest Americans exert more political influence then less fortunate 
Americans); Benjamin I. Page et al., Democracy and the Policy Preferences of Wealthy 
Americans, 11 PERSP. ON POLS. 51 (2013) (discussing what wealthy Americans seek from 
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preferences are systematically frustrated suggests that the ability of the 
wealthy to disproportionately influence government officials through 
their financial domination of the electoral process has limited the extent 
to which these officials remain responsive to the voting public.45  And 
the social science demonstrating the control of the wealthy has led some 
to raise the question of whether the United States is an oligarchy.46  
Correspondingly, this anti-democratic capture of legislation 
understandably leaves a large portion of the country feeling effectively 
disenfranchised and cynical about the state of our democracy.47 
1. A Small Subset of Wealthy Individuals (the “Donor Class”) Already 
Dominate Congressional Fundraising 
It takes a lot of money to run for federal office.  During the 2012 
election cycle, candidates for the House of Representatives spent 
$1,149,212,122 on their campaigns.48  Candidates for Senate spent 
                                                                                                             
politics and how their policy preferences differ from other citizens); see also DAVID 
CALLAHAN & J. MIJIN CHA, STACKED DECK:  HOW THE DOMINANCE OF POLITICS BY THE 
AFFLUENT & BUSINESS UNDERMINES ECONOMIC MOBILITY IN AMERICA, DEMOS 1, 
http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/StackedDeck2_1.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 12, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/YM7F-HXUU (providing evidence that the U.S. 
political system is increasingly dominated by wealthy interests). 
45 See AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE, supra note 44, at 239 (explaining representational 
inequality).  See generally Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform:  The Root of 
All Evil is Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 301, 312–13 (1989) (explaining influence in 
politics).  Mr. Lowenstein concludes: 
In summary, although it would be an overstatement to suggest that 
economic interests always or nearly always contribute to influence 
official conduct rather than to influence the outcome of elections, it is 
probably correct to say that they usually follow this strategy, with the 
possible and partial exception of labor unions. 
Id. 
46 See, e.g., Study:  US is an Oligarchy, Not a Democracy, BBC NEWS (Apr. 17, 2014, 5:09 
PM), http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-echochambers-27074746, archived at 
http://perma.cc/5PPJ-L656 (explaining that the U.S. is not a democracy). 
47 See Liz Kennedy, Policy Brief:  Stop the Next Citizens United:  McCutcheon v. FEC and 
the Crisis of Confidence in American Democracy, DEMOS 1–2, 5 (2013), 
http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/McCutcheon-document.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/QM7-BD72 [hereinafter Next Citizens United] (stating that 
Americans are outraged about the impact of money on the U.S. government); Liz Kennedy, 
Policy Brief:  Citizens Actually United:  The Overwhelming, Bi-Partisan Opposition to Corporate 
Political Spending and Support for Common Sense Reform, DEMOS (2012), http://www.demos. 
org/sites/default/files/publications/CitizensActuallyUnited_CorporatePoliticalSpending.
pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/7Z2J-6WNF [hereinafter Citizens Actually United] 
(“agreeing that there is too much corporate money in politics”). 
48 BLAIR BOWIE & ADAM LIOZ, BILLION-DOLLAR DEMOCRACY:  THE UNPRECEDENTED ROLE 
OF MONEY IN THE 2012 ELECTIONS, DEMOS 3 (2013), http://www.demos.org/sites/ 
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$734,022,256.49  Individual contributions remain the primary source of 
campaign funds for these candidates.50 
Furthermore, large donations made by a very small group of 
wealthy individuals, identified by Professor Overton as the “donor 
class,” comprise the bulk of these individual contributions.51  For 
example, less than 0.06% of the population provided more than 50% of 
all individual contributions to candidates for Congress through 
contributions of $1000 or more.52  And, while candidates have long relied 
on large donors for campaign funding, the degree to which a tiny 
fraction of the population dominates contributions and spending in 
support of candidates has shot up in recent years.53  The Sunlight 
Foundation reported that in the 2012 elections “candidates got more 
money from a smaller percentage of the population than any year for 
which [they] have data.”54 
2. The Donor Class Looks Different than the Country as a Whole and 
Holds Different Policy Preferences 
The donor class does not reflect the diversity of the country—its 
members are disproportionately college-educated, white, male, fifty 
years or older, and high-earning.55  These individuals tend to live in 
small communities across the country.56  Most importantly, the donor 
class has very different priorities than the average American, particularly 
on economic issues.57  For example, over a quarter of the general public 
                                                                                                             
default/files/publications/billion.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/V9X2-E5TK 
[hereinafter BILLION-DOLLAR DEMOCRACY]. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 12–13. 
51 Id. at 8; see Spencer Overton, The Donor Class:  Campaign Finance, Democracy, and 
Participation, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 73, 74–75 (Nov. 2004) [hereinafter Donor Class] (discussing 
the donor class). 
52 BILLION-DOLLAR DEMOCRACY, supra note 48, at 13 (using a chart to depict large donor 
dominance of congressional fundraising). 
53 Id. at 4. 
54 Lee Drutman, The Political 1% of the 1%, SUNLIGHT FOUND. BLOG (June 24, 2013, 9:00 
AM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2013/06/24/1pct_of_the_1pct/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/VNE9-AMDJ [hereinafter Political 1%]. 
55 Donor Class, supra note 51, at 102. 
56 See Lee Drutman, The Political One Percent of the One Percent, SUNLIGHT FOUND. BLOG 
(Dec. 13, 2011, 11:49 AM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2011/12/13/the-political-
one-percent-of-the-one-percent/, archived at http://perma.cc/5EMP-A3HP (“They tend to 
cluster in a limited number of metropolitan zip codes, especially New York, Washington, 
Chicago, and Los Angeles.”). 
57 See Page et al., supra note 44, at 55 (discussing how the wealthy appear to differ 
drastically from the general public regarding the nation’s priorities). 
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said unemployment was the most important problem in early 2011.58  
Only 11% of the wealthy agreed they were more concerned with the 
deficit.59  Similarly, more than two-thirds of Americans believe that the 
federal government should ensure that “everyone who wants to work 
can find a job,” but less than a fifth of the donor class agreed.60  
Additionally, almost eight out of ten Americans, including over 50% of 
Republican voters, want the minimum wage to be high enough to keep a 
family out of poverty, while only about four out of ten from the donor 
class agree.61  The wealthy are also much more inclined than the general 
public to favor spending cuts, particularly in social welfare programs, 
over tax increases.62 
a. The Preferences of the Donor Class Drive Legislative Outputs, Leading to 
Policies Skewed in Favor of the Already Privileged 
A spate of research reports confirms the understanding that he who 
pays the piper calls the tune.63  If the donor class wants something 
different from working and middle-class voters, the donor class wins.64  
For example, Princeton political scientist Martin Gilens finds that “the 
American government does respond to the public’s preferences, but that 
responsiveness is strongly tilted toward the most affluent citizens.  
Indeed, under most circumstances, the preferences of the vast majority of 
Americans appear to have essentially no impact on which policies the 
government does or doesn’t adopt.”65 
His colleague, Professor Bartels, likewise finds that “affluent people 
have considerable clout, while the preferences of the people in the 
bottom third of the income distribution have no apparent impact on the 
                                                 
58 Lydia Saad, U.S. Subgroups Say Economy, Jobs Are Most Important Problem, GALLUP 
(June 10, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/148001/subgroups-say-economy-jobs-
important-problem.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/WTX2-DNU2 (citing results of 
Gallup’s monthly Most Important Problems poll measured from January 2011 to May 
2011). 
59 See Page et al., supra note 44, at 55 (discussing that only 11% of wealthy respondents 
felt that unemployment was the most important problem in the nation). 
60 Id. at 57. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 56. 
63 See ADAM LIOZ & BLAIR BOWIE, MILLION-DOLLAR MEGAPHONES:  SUPER PACS AND 
UNLIMITED OUTSIDE SPENDING IN THE 2012 ELECTIONS, DEMOS (2012), 
http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/MegaphonesMillionaires-
DemosUSPIRG.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/VU47-RW9Y 
(citing a report from the 2012 election campaign). 
64  See id. (focusing on spending by outside non-candidate groups attempting to influence 
elections). 
65 AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE, supra note 44, at 1. 
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behavior of their elected officials.”66  And, this year, Professor Gilens and 
Professor Page released a new report that analyzed almost 1800 policy 
outcomes over a twenty-year period, concluding “economic elites and 
organized groups representing business interests have substantial 
independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while mass-based 
interest groups and average citizens have little or no independent 
influence.”67  The consequences of these differential impacts are vast.  
Professor Gilens found that “political donations . . . but not voting or 
volunteering, resembles the pattern of representational inequality,” 
illuminating the strong link between large monetary contributions and 
legislative outcomes.68 
When the government is unresponsive to the public’s preferences for 
how to structure the economy, and instead privileges the interests of the 
already privileged, we see results like the real value of the minimum 
wage declining, and then flat-lining, after 1968 while the effective tax 
rate for millionaires has been falling since 1954.69  Despite support from a 
majority of Americans across party lines, members of Congress have 
refused to pass legislation that would help hard-working families move 
above the poverty line.70  And yet, billionaire Warren Buffet famously 
pays a lower tax rate than his secretary.71 
Turning to the mechanics of this process, it appears that large 
contributions enable donors to exert influence over politics and policy-
making in several ways.72  First, the donor class can serve as a 
gatekeeper.73  Because donors generally support candidates who share 
                                                 
66 LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY:  THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW 
GILDED AGE 285 (Princeton Univ. Press 2008). 
67 Gilens & Page, supra note 44, at 3.  
68 AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE, supra note 44, at 239. 
69 Callahan & Cha, supra note 44, at 12.  
70 See id. at 13–14 (discussing the results of a poll that showed seventy-eight percent of 
the general public supported increasing the minimum wage so that families did not fall 
below poverty line). 
71 See Chris Isidore, Buffett Says He's Still Paying Lower Tax Rate Than His Secretary, CNN 
(Mar. 4, 2013, 11:20 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/03/04/news/economy/buffett-
secretary-taxes/, archived at http://perma.cc/8T7R-YL7Y (noting that Warren Buffet’s 
income is generated from investment gains rather than employment, which results in him 
likely being the lowest paying taxpayer in his office). 
72 See John Craig & David Madland, How Campaign Contributions and Lobbing Can Lead to 
Inefficient Economic Policy, CTR. FOR AM. PROG. (May 2, 2014), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/report/2014/05/02/88917/how-
campaign-contributions-and-lobbying-can-lead-to-inefficient-economic-policy/, archived at 
https://perma.cc/69U8-NWDF (explaining that campaign contributions lead to inefficient 
economic policy). 
73 See Political 1%, supra note 54 (“[T]hese donors represent the 1% of the 1%, an elite 
class that increasingly serves as the gatekeepers of public office in the United States.”). 
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their views, there is a culling in the first instance in which political 
viability of a candidate is not related to the depth of her experience or 
the strength of his ideas.74  Given the need for robust fundraising to 
succeed in competitive elections, the donor class can narrow the initial 
field of viable candidates by offering or withholding support.75  
Additionally, financial support is correlated with successful campaigns, 
suggesting that candidates supported by the donor class will prevail 
more often.76  The Sunlight Foundation looked at the top political donors 
in 2012 and found: 
Not a single member of the House or Senate elected that 
year won without financial assistance from this group.  
Money from the nation’s 31,385 biggest givers found its 
way into the coffers of every successful congressional 
candidate.  And [84%] of those elected in 2012 took more 
money from these 1% of the 1% donors than they did 
from all of their small donors (individuals who gave 
$200 or less) combined.77 
Second, as Congressman John Sarbanes explains, “[d]riven by their 
need to raise a lot of cash and to do it quickly, candidates forge a 
dependency on this narrow class of funders.”78  A lobbyist commented 
about the motivations of donors, saying, “[t]here is no question that 
money creates the relationships[,] . . . [t]he large contributions enable 
them to establish relationships, and that increases the chances they’ll be 
successful with their public policy agenda.”79  The dependency of the 
candidates on these elite funders can lead to candidates shifting their 
positions or priorities even if they attempt to rationalize it away.80  
                                                 
74 See BILLION-DOLLAR DEMOCRACY, supra note 48, at 18 (noting that the wealthy play a 
filtering role in the election process). 
75 See Adam Lioz, Breaking the Vicious Cycle:  How the Supreme Court Helped Create the 
Inequality Era and Why a New Jurisprudence Must Lead Us out, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 1227, 
1246–47 (2013) (addressing the political candidate’s need to align his political agenda with 
large contributors to secure donations). 
76 See id. at 1248, 1250 (discussing the role of money in elections). 
77 Political 1%, supra note 54. 
78 John P. Sarbanes & Raymond O'Mara III, Foreword, 8 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 9 (2014). 
79 DANIEL P. TOKAJI & RENATA E. B. STRAUSE, THE NEW SOFT MONEY:  OUTSIDE SPENDING 
IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 75 (2014), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/ 
thenewsoftmoney/wp-content/uploads/sites/57/2014/06/the-new-soft-money-WEB.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/7HNN-S2LX. 
80 See, e.g., Lioz, supra note 75, at 1246–47 (detailing a former congressional candidate’s 
experience dialing for campaign dollars and finding that “there was definitely a shift in 
emphasis” as to his positions). 
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Illustrating this process, former Senator Kerrey discussed the operation 
of large money on political decision-making as follows: 
I make a decision to vote on one issue that’s different 
than what I really—or I just don’t examine it any further.  
I persuade myself that I’ve always been against raising 
the minimum wage and people are contributing to me 
because I’ve always been against raising the minimum 
wage.  But the fact is I’ve closed my mind off to any 
thought of voting to raise the minimum wage because I 
know it’s going to cut off a significant amount of 
financial support if I do.  That’s what I’m saying.  I say 
it’s corrupting as an impact upon what you’re willing to 
at least consider as the possible right course of action.81 
Other former members of Congress have been even blunter, former 
Senator Simpson said, “[t]oo often, Members' first thought is not what is 
right or what they believe, but how it will affect fundraising.”82 
Further illustrating the improper influence of the wealthy elite on the 
legislative agenda, Professor Tokaji and Renata Strause of Ohio State’s 
Moritz College of Law recently released a report that examined the real-
world impact of this new unlimited political spending and found that 
“[i]ndependent expenditures drove the agenda.”83  They quote Senator 
Nelson saying that some outside spenders have “‘unhealthy 
expectations’ of the elected officials they assist.”84  One former 
Representative put it this way, “So is the risk there?  Obviously.  Are 
there going to be people that are influenced in a way that they might not 
otherwise be?  Obviously.”85  And, as Senator Conrad said of big 
spenders, “they’re going to have somebody’s ear.”86 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, even if our elected 
representatives are not just concerned about raising funds for reelection, 
it matters who they are hearing from and listening to.87  They hear much 
                                                 
81 TOKAJI & STRAUSE, supra note 79, at 78–79. 
82 McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 481 (D.D.C. 2003). 
83 TOKAJI & STRAUSE, supra note 79, at 61. 
84 Id. at 76. 
85 Id. at 79. 
86 Id. 
87 See Ryan Grim & Sabrina Siddiqui, Call Time for Congress Shows How Fundraising 
Dominates Bleak Work Life, HUFF. POST:  POLITICS (Jan. 8, 2013, 7:30 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/08/call-time-congressional-fundraising_n_242 
7291.html, archived at http://perma.cc/P9PH-4Y94 (discussing the time members of 
Congress spend on the telephone fundraising compared to doing Congressional work). 
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more from some interests than others.88  It is estimated that elected 
officials spend between four and six hours per day fundraising, which 
generally means calling people making at least a half million dollars.89  
Senator Murphy explains: 
I talked a lot more about carried interest inside that call 
room than I did in the supermarket. . . .  They have 
fundamentally different problems than other 
people . . . [a]nd in Connecticut especially, you spend a 
lot of time on the phone with people who work in the 
financial markets.  And so you’re hearing a lot about 
problems that bankers have not a lot of problems that 
people who work at the mill in Thomaston, Conn., have.  
You certainly have to stop and check yourself.90 
Moreover, large contributors are more likely to be granted special 
access to elected officials.91  For example, large donors might be invited 
to attend special fundraising events with the candidates.92  Outside of 
special events, two researchers from Yale and the University of 
California conducted a field experiment that showed how members of 
Congress and their staff made themselves much more available to 
contributors than to non-contributing voting constituents.93  The 
researchers requested meetings with 191 members of Congress, 
identifying themselves as contributors or constituents.94  Almost 20% of 
the contributor requests resulted in a meeting with the legislator or a 
senior staff member compared with just 5% of the constituent requests.95  
                                                 
88 Id. 
89 See Paul Blumenthal, Chris Murphy:  ‘Soul-Crushing’ Fundraising is Bad for Congress, 
HUFF. POST:  POLITICS (May 7, 2013, 5:40 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/ 
07/chris-murphy-frundraising_n_3232143.html, archived at http://perma.cc/XRA9-6K9W 
[hereinafter Chris Murphy] (describing typical income levels of donors that Senator Murphy 
regularly calls); Grim & Siddiqui, supra note 87 (discussing the time members of Congress 
must spend on the telephone fundraising compared to doing Congressional work). 
90 Chris Murphy, supra note 89. 
91 See Joshua L. Kalla & David E. Broockman, Congressional Officials Grant Access to 
Individuals Because They Have Contributed to Campaigns: A Randomized Field Experiment 
(2014), http://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/~broockma/kalla_broockman_donor_access_field_ 
experiment.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/A8T4-6UU3 (discussing the preferential 
treatment large donors to political campaigns receive). 
92 See Donor Class, supra note 51, at 102 (noting the special access to politicians donors 
receive). 
93 See Kalla & Broockman, supra note 91 (describing the author’s field experiment for the 
purpose of assessing the effects donations have upon legislative behavior). 
94 Id. at 9–10. 
95 See id. at 16 (citing results from the level of access gained in constituent and revealed 
donor conditions). 
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The very wealthy have even more access with 40% of wealthy poll 
respondents reporting at least one contact with their senator over a six-
month span.96  And the McCutcheon decision has exacerbated this.  One 
donor who has given over $175,000 more than the former aggregate limit 
said, “[y]ou have to realize, when you start contributing to all these 
guys, they give you access to meet them and talk about your issues.”97 
b. Increasing Large Contributors’ Ability to Use Money in Politics Leads to a 
Crisis of Confidence in the Integrity of Our Democracy—A Constitutional 
Concern 
In the seminal modern campaign finance case Buckley v. Valeo, the 
Court acknowledged that “Congress could legitimately conclude that the 
avoidance of the appearance of improper influence ‘is also critical . . . if 
confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be 
eroded to a disastrous extent.’”98  In other words, when people believe 
the government is corrupt, they lose confidence in our democracy.99 
This loss of faith is a real concern.  Over 80% of Americans, with 
significant bi-partisan majorities, disagree with Chief Justice Roberts’ 
view that only quid pro quo corruption—basically, bribery—constitutes 
corruption of government.100  Rather, Americans know that 
when financial supporters have more access and influence with members 
of Congress than regular Americans, that also is a corruption of 
democratic government.101  Even before McCutcheon, Americans 
overwhelmingly recognized how our government’s elected 
representatives are more responsive to the small group of people that 
                                                 
96 Page et al., supra note 44, at 54–55. 
97 Wealthy Political Donors, supra note 25. 
98 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976) (quoting U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n 
of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973)). 
99 See ROBERT POST, MONEY, POLITICS, AND THE CONSTITUTION:  BEYOND CITIZENS UNITED:  
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATION AND FIRST AMENDMENT FUNDAMENTALS 18 (M. Youn, ed. 
2011) (“[T]he growing fear that our elections are increasingly failing to fulfill their 
democratic task, and that as a consequence the successful legitimation of our constitutional 
government may be slipping from our grasp.”). 
100 Citizens Actually United, supra note 47. 
101 See id. (concluding that “[85%] of Americans call it corruption when financial 
supporters have more access and influence with members of Congress than average 
Americans, [57%] say it is very corrupt.”); see also Thomas B. Edsall, The Value of Political 
Corruption, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/06/opinion/ 
thomas-edsall-the-value-of-political-corruption.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
BL7G-9EVC (“From 2006 to 2013, the percentage of Americans convinced that corruption 
was ‘widespread throughout the government in this country’ grew from [59%] to [79%], 
according to Gallup.”). 
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make large campaign contributions.102  The public understands how 
these concerns are tied to contribution limits, disagreeing directly with 
the Court’s decision in McCutcheon.103  A recent poll showed that a strong 
majority of Americans support aggregate contribution limits and a 
plurality believe that such limits reduce corruption.104 
These concerns about corruption within politics have measurable 
results that call into question the functioning of our democracy.  In the 
past year, Americans’ “confidence in Congress [was] not only the lowest 
                                                 
102 Memorandum from Celinda Lake, David Mermin & John Norris, Lake Research 
Partners and Brian Nienaber & Ashlee Rich, The Terrance Group to Interested Parties 2 
(Feb. 2009), https://www.mainecleanelections.org/sites/default/files/polling/2009_ 
Polling_Memo.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/S625-N9SH (describing the results of a 
bipartisan poll, which reported that voters supported providing limited public funding of 
qualified candidates if they agreed to decline large contributions in an attempt to address 
big money and lobbyist concerns); A Look at H.R. 1826, and the Public Financing of 
Congressional Campaigns:  Hearing Before the Comm. on House Admin. H.R., 111th Cong. 
2 (2009), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg52711/html/CHRG-
111hhrg52711.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/3M6B-4PUY (statement of Arn H. Pearson, 
Vice President for Programs, Common Cause) (discussing voter concerns that large 
campaign contributions prevent Congress from dealing with issues facing the nations); 
Sarah Dutton et al., Americans' View of Congress:  Throw 'Em out, CBS NEWS (May 21, 2014, 
6:30 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/americans-view-of-congress-throw-em-out/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/6REP-BFCB (“Three in four think wealthy Americans have a 
better chance than others of influencing the election process. Only [23%] say all Americans 
have an equal chance to do so.”); see also Edsall, supra note 101 (noting the public’s belief in 
growing corruption).  Mr. Edsall states: 
Over the period from 1964 to 2012, the percentage of voters who said 
that government was “run by a few big interests looking out for 
themselves more than doubled, from [29%] to [79%], while the share of 
the electorate that believed government was run for the benefit of all 
the people” fell from [64%] to [19%], according to American National 
Election Studies and data supplied to me by Alan Abramowitz, a 
political scientist at Emory. 
Id.; Victoria S. Shabo, "Money, Like Water . . .":  Revisiting Equality in Campaign Finance 
Regulation After the 2004 "Summer of 527s", 84 N.C. L. REV. 221, 252 (2005) (describing 
findings of public opinion researchers showing that “Americans overwhelmingly believe 
that political contributions tinge the policymaking process”). 
103 See A Blistering Dissent in ‘McCutcheon’:  Conservatives Substituted Opinion for Fact, 
MOYERS & CO. (Apr. 2, 2014), http://billmoyers.com/2014/04/02/a-blistering-dissent-in-
mccutcheon-conservatives-substituted-opinion-for-fact/, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
9AZF-BFZJ (discussing the Court’s four-member dissent). 
104 See Corruption Effects of Donation Limits—Individual Candidates, YOUGOV (Apr. 2014), 
http://cdn.yougov.com/cumulus_uploads/document/vjq77o8ddf/tabs_Combined_camp
aign_finance_20140404.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/M6R4-M74F (reporting polling 
results regarding corruption and campaign donations).  See generally David M. Primo & 
Jeffrey Milyo, Campaign Finance Laws and Political Efficacy:  Evidence from the States, 5 
ELECTION L.J. 23, 26 (June 2005) (finding little impact but acknowledging that they found 
“some evidence that public disclosure and restrictions on contributions from organizations 
improve perceived political efficacy . . . ”). 
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on record [with only 7% expressing a great deal or a lot of confidence in 
the legislature], but also the lowest Gallup has recorded for any 
institution in the [forty-one]-year trend.”105  This alienation is driving a 
significant portion of the public away from political engagement.106  One 
poll showed that almost two-thirds of Americans, and almost the same 
percentage of Republicans and Democrats, trust the government less 
because big donors, in this case Super PACs, have more influence than 
regular voters.107  When faced with unlimited spending from Super 
PACs, a quarter of Americans said they are less likely to vote, and four in 
ten Americans believe their votes don’t matter very much, because big 
donors have “so much more influence over elected officials than average 
Americans.”108  Even in 2008, an election with record turnout, eighty 
million eligible voters failed to participate; when eligible voters who said 
they were unlikely to vote were asked why they did not pay attention to 
politics, a majority of them answered “[it is so] corrupt.”109 
IV.  WHAT DOES THE ROBERTS COURT GET WRONG IN ITS MONEY IN 
POLITICS JURISPRUDENCE? 
The preceding discussion focused on the granular holding of the 
McCutcheon plurality decision, the political realities of money in politics, 
and its impact on democratic self-governance.110  But it is also important 
to look at the place of McCutcheon within the arc of the Roberts Court’s 
deregulatory project.111  This section looks at the larger context of 
constitutional doctrine and developments in money in politics 
jurisprudence.112 This section first considers McCutcheon’s place in the 
Court’s prior jurisprudence in this area, noting its inconsistency with the 
direct precedent of Buckley and other cases that defined the term 
“corruption.” It then discusses the failure of the McCutcheon plurality to 
                                                 
105 Rebecca Riffkin, Public Faith in Congress Falls Again, Hits Historic Low, GALLUP (June 19, 
2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/171710/public-faith-congress-falls-again-hits-historic 
-low.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/9ZXZ-HQEQ. 
106  See Citizens Actually United, supra note 47 (explaining that Americans know financial 
supporters improperly influence politics). 
107 National Survey:  Super PACs, Corruption, and Democracy, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 2 
(Apr. 2012), http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/national-survey-super-pacs-
corruption-and-democracy, archived at http://perma.cc/F35R-BTWB. 
108  Id. at 3. 
109 Susan Page et al., Why 90 Million Americans Won’t Vote in November, USA TODAY (Aug. 
15, 2012, 6:15 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/politics/story/2012-08-
15/non-voters-obama-romney/57055184/1, archived at http://perma.cc/8ZP8-X47J. 
110  See infra Part IV (discussing the plurality decision in McCutcheon). 
111  See infra Part IV.A.1–2 (recognizing stare decisis). 
112  See infra Part IV.B (discussing how the McCutcheon decision failed to consider 
important democratic values). 
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consider important democratic values other than corruption that are 
inextricably bound in the First Amendment and the Constitution.  Next, 
it shows how the McCutcheon plurality’s approach is not applied 
consistently.  And it concludes by explaining how Chief Justice Roberts 
has shifted the campaign finance analytical framework, privileging the 
right of the powerful to use their resources to influence policy-making 
over the right of the public to participate meaningfully. 
A. The McCutcheon Plurality Rejected a Significant Portion of the Court’s 
Earlier Case Law on Aggregate Limits and the Governmental Interest in 
Preventing Corruption 
1. The McCutcheon Plurality Effectively Overturned the Direct 
Precedent of Buckley 
In Buckley, the Supreme Court upheld the aggregate contribution 
limits in the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”).113  However, the 
McCutcheon decision invalidates these limits by directly rejecting a type 
of contribution limit upheld in Buckley.114  Chief Justice Roberts contends 
the holding in Buckley is ripe for plenary reexamination because the 
aggregate contribution limits challenged in McCutcheon operated within 
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (“BCRA”) regime.115  BCRA added 
several additional anti-circumvention measures to the original FECA 
scheme under which the aggregate limits were reviewed in Buckley, and 
there were less restrictive means of preventing circumvention of the base 
limits.116  Consequently, as discussed below, these are not good reasons 
for treating Buckley as not controlling.117 
While it is true that BCRA created a new regulatory regime, or at 
least, a new overlay, this is true of every provision upheld, or 
invalidated, in Buckley.118  But the McCutcheon plurality did not 
invalidate all of the holdings in Buckley, despite Justice Thomas’ 
concurrence advocating that step.119  Thus, it is unclear how the existence 
                                                 
113 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 38 (1976). 
114 McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462 (2014). 
115 Richard Hasen, Rethinking the Unconstitutionality of Contribution and Expenditure Limits 
in Ballot Measure Campaigns, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 855, 886 (2005). 
116 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1446. 
117 See infra Part IV.A.1 (explaining why Buckley should be viewed as controlling). 
118 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 286–94 (citing to the concurring and dissenting opinions). 
119 Compare McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1451 (acknowledging continued vitality of the 
contribution/expenditure divide and base limits), with id. at 1462 (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(calling for overruling of Buckley). 
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of BCRA alone allowed the Court to disregard Buckley’s upholding of the 
aggregate limits in FECA.120 
Additionally, Justice Breyer’s dissent pointed out the holes in Chief 
Justice Roberts’ reliance on supposedly new alternative ways of 
preventing circumvention of the base limits as a reason for 
distinguishing Buckley.121  He explained:   
For the most part, the alternatives the plurality mentions 
were similarly available at the time of Buckley.  Their 
hypothetical presence did not prevent the Court from 
upholding aggregate limits in 1976.  How can their 
continued hypothetical presence lead the plurality now 
to conclude that aggregate limits are “poorly tailored?”  
How can their continued hypothetical presence lead the 
Court to overrule Buckley now?122 
The foundational principle of stare decisis, absent special justification, 
requires adherence to precedent to ensure that decisions are “‘founded in 
the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals.’”123  The factual 
changes Chief Justice Roberts described appear fairly minor.  And the 
principle of stare decisis is given extra force when overturning a 
precedent would disrupt settled state statutes.124  As Chief Justice 
Roberts acknowledged, eight states had laws setting aggregate 
contribution limits.125  Moreover, even if Buckley should not be 
considered inviolable and might be distinguishable from the issues 
presented in McCutcheon, a more robust application of the stare decisis 
doctrine would have enhanced the public’s confidence that the radical 
jurisprudential shift in McCutcheon was not just a product of the 
individual jurists’ agendas.126 
                                                 
120 See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1462 (analyzing the Court’s reasoning for rejecting 
Buckley) (citations omitted). 
121 Id. at 1479 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
122 Id. 
123 Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2651 (2014) (quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 
265 (1986)). 
124 Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Ry. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991). 
125 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1451–52 n.7 (listing Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New York, Rhode Island, Wisconsin, and Wyoming as states that impose 
base limits on contributions). 
126 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 414 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (discussing the lack of respect to precedent paid by the justices joining 
the majority opinion).  “In the end, the Court’s rejection of Austin and McConnell comes 
down to nothing more than its disagreement with their results.  Virtually every one of its 
arguments was made and rejected in those cases, and the majority opinion is essentially an 
amalgamation of resuscitated dissents.”  Id. 
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2. The McCutcheon Plurality Radically Reconceives the Bulk of Its 
Precedent Defining Corruption 
As Justice Breyer discussed in his dissent in McCutcheon, by holding 
that the only legitimate government interests sufficient to uphold 
contributions limits are the prevention of quid pro quo corruption or the 
appearance thereof, Chief Justice Roberts completely disregards the 
animating rationale in McConnell and the more expansive understanding 
of corruption discussed in other Supreme Court cases.127  In McConnell, 
the Court upheld BCRA’s ban on soft money precisely because it 
recognized the government’s interest in preventing corruption or the 
appearance thereof extended to the risk that large donors would be able 
to exercise undue influence on the legislative process.128  The McConnell 
Court found that corruption of government is “not confined to bribery of 
public officials, but extend[s] to the broader threat from politicians too 
compliant with the wishes of large contributors.”129  The possibility that 
legislators will “decide issues not on the merits or the desires of their 
constituencies, but according to the wishes of those who have made 
large financial contributions valued by the officeholder” is a more subtle 
form of corruption than straight quid pro quo transactions, but is “equally 
[as] dispiriting.”130  As the Court in McConnell put it, “[m]ore 
importantly, plaintiffs conceive of corruption too narrowly.  Our cases 
have firmly established that Congress' legitimate interest extends beyond 
preventing simple cash-for-votes corruption to curbing ‘undue influence 
on an officeholder's judgment, and the appearance of such influence.’”131 
The McConnell Court was right.  Going as far back as Buckley, the 
Court has acknowledged that contribution limits are constitutional 
because they function to prevent “the appearance of corruption 
stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent 
in a regime of large individual financial contributions”132  Similar 
understandings of the type of corruption that was a sufficient 
government concern to permit campaign finance limits were advanced in 
FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Committee, FEC v. Colorado 
Republican Federal Campaign Committee, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri 
                                                 
127 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1469–71. 
128 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 143 (2003). 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 153. 
131 Id. at 150 (quoting FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 441 
(2001)). 
132 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976). 
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Government PAC, and FEC v. Beaumont.133  In Nixon, the Court most 
explicitly stated that improper influence went beyond quid pro quo 
corruption: 
In speaking of “improper influence” and “opportunities 
for abuse” in addition to “quid pro quo arrangements,” 
we recognized a concern not confined to bribery of 
public officials, but extending to the broader threat from 
politicians too compliant with the wishes of large 
contributors.  These were the obvious points behind our 
recognition that the Congress could constitutionally 
address the power of money “to influence governmental 
action” in ways less “blatant and specific” than 
bribery.134 
Additionally, members of the Nixon Court recognized the importance of 
campaign finance rules, finding that “by limiting the size of the largest 
contributions, such restrictions aim to democratize the influence that 
money itself may bring to bear upon the electoral process.”135 
However, in McCutcheon, Chief Justice Roberts did not truly wrestle 
with these statements, merely noting that “[i]t is fair to say . . . ‘that we 
have not always spoken about corruption in a clear or consistent 
voice.’”136  Instead, he transforms dicta from Citizens United v. FEC and 
non-binding language from a partial concurrence in McConnell into 
binding precedent.137  To understand this dubious alchemy, we need to 
understand the holdings of Citizens United and McConnell, as well as 
distinguish the holdings of those cases from the dicta and from Chief 
Justice Roberts’ opinion in McCutcheon.138 
                                                 
133 See FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 155–56 (2003) (discussing campaign contribution 
corruption and the need for limits); Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. at 441 
(defining corruption in the campaign finance system and the need for limits); Nixon v. 
Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 388–89 (2000) (discussing corruptive influence and the 
need for campaign finance limits); FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 
U.S. 480, 497 (1985) (defining corruption as “a subversion of the political process” in which 
“[e]lected officials are influenced to act contrary to their obligations of office by the 
prospect of financial gain to themselves or infusions of money into their campaigns”). 
134 Nixon, 528 U.S. at 389. 
135 Id. at 401 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
136 McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1451 (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 
310, 447 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
137 Id. 
138 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 310 (citing Justice Kennedy’s holding); McConnell v. 
FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 363 (2003) (holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the 
BCRA); McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1462 (concluding that the aggregate limits on contribution 
intrude on citizen’s First Amendment rights). 
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In Citizens United and McConnell, Justice Kennedy expressed his 
belief that ingratiation and access are not corruption.139  But Justice 
Kennedy did not author the controlling decision in McConnell, which, as 
noted above, upheld BCRA’s ban on soft money because of concerns 
about ingratiation and access.140  Also, in Citizens United, this definition 
of corruption was not necessary to the disposition of the case, which 
focused on the independence of the expenditures and whether a 
prohibition on the same could turn on the corporate identity of the 
speaker.141  Moreover, as noted by Justice Breyer, the broad “holding” of 
Citizens United assumed by Chief Justice Roberts would have overruled 
McConnell—a result that was not contemplated in either the Citizens 
United majority or dissenting opinions.142  But, in McCutcheon, Chief 
Justice Roberts primarily cites to Citizens United when holding that only 
the government’s interests in preventing quid pro quo corruption or the 
appearance thereof can support contribution limits.143  Even worse, Chief 
Justice Roberts does not even do the courtesy of also importing Justice 
Kennedy’s caveat that “[i]f elected officials succumb to improper 
influences from independent expenditures; if they surrender their best 
judgment; and if they put expediency before principle, then surely there 
is cause for concern.”144  Accordingly, Chief Justice Roberts’ holding in 
McCutcheon extends the dicta of Citizens United and marks a radical new 
rule that is detached from real-world evidence and concerns.145 
                                                 
139 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 297 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see 
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360 (“Ingratiation and access, in any event, are not 
corruption . . . [t]he appearance of influence or access, furthermore, will not cause the 
electorate to lose faith in our democracy.”). 
140 See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 150 (quoting FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign 
Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 441 (2001)) (“More importantly, plaintiffs conceive of corruption too 
narrowly.  Our cases have firmly established that Congress' legitimate interest extends 
beyond preventing simple cash-for-votes corruption to curbing ‘undue influence on an 
officeholder's judgment, and the appearance of such influence.’”). 
141 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1470–71 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see Richard L. Hasen, 
Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L. REV. 191, 213 (2012) (“Of these cases, 
the most important one is Citizens United v. FEC, in which the Court endorsed in dicta a 
very stingy definition of corruption that excludes ingratiation and the sale of access, and 
rejected the idea that political equality could justify regulations limiting political speech.”). 
142 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1471 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
143 Id. at 1441–42. 
144 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 361. 
145 Professor Zephyr Teachout offers an even deeper critique of Chief Justice Roberts’ 
devotion to the term quid pro quo corruption, arguing that it does not have a robust 
doctrinal history as used by Chief Justice Roberts and that its application in criminal 
bribery law, to the extent that states and the federal government even require its presence, 
stems from due process concerns related to criminal punishment, not an underlying 
constitutional definition of the term “corruption.”  See Zephyr Teachout, What John Roberts 
Doesn’t Get About Corruption, POLITICO (Apr. 14, 2014), http://www.politico.com/ 
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B. The McCutcheon Plurality Failed to Consider Important Democratic 
Values Other Than Corruption That Are Inextricably Bound in the First 
Amendment and the Constitution 
As seen by Chief Justice Roberts’ invocation of Burke and Justice 
Breyer’s reference to Rousseau, almost all of the justices in McCutcheon 
signed on to opinions that implicitly acknowledge that the First 
Amendment raises questions about the nature of democracy.146  This 
suggests that the First Amendment must be interpreted to serve 
democratic ends and also reveals disagreement about the underlying 
vision of democracy embodied by the Constitution.147 
Justice Breyer explained that the narrow conception of corruption 
endorsed by Chief Justice Roberts creates a world in which large 
contributions can “break[] the constitutionally necessary ‘chain of 
communication’ between the people and their representatives” because 
“[w]here enough money calls the tune, the general public will not be 
heard.”148  Justice Breyer reasoned that, once this occurs, the “free 
marketplace of political ideas loses its point.”149  Justice Breyer makes the 
                                                                                                             
magazine/story/2014/04/what-john-roberts-doesnt-get-about-corruption-105683.html#.V 
B29E_IdWH9, archived at http://perma.cc/WQZX-XPAV (criticizing Chief Justice Roberts’ 
definition of corruption); see also Allison Orr Larsen, Factual Precedents, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 
59, 94 (2013) (suggesting that the Court, despite its ostensible fact-finding in Citizens United, 
actually established a bright-line legal rule expressing the Court’s general world view); 
Douglas M. Spencer & Abby K. Wood, Citizens United, States Divided:  An Empirical 
Analysis of Independent Political Spending, 89 IND. L.J. 315, 360–61 (2014).  Spencer and Wood 
state: 
[T]he Court admitted that it did not care whether independent 
expenditures actually corrupt the political process because, in the 
Court's eyes, independent expenditures cannot corrupt as a matter of 
law, any evidence to the contrary notwithstanding.  We strongly 
disagree with the Court's reliance on this legal fiction; it is the bluntest 
of all possible instruments for judging regulations of the political 
process. 
Id. 
146 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1461–62; id. at 1467 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see Hellman, supra 
note 38, at 1402 (arguing that any conception of corruption must draw from views of what 
constitutes a healthy democracy and the appropriate role of legislators and members of the 
polity). 
147 See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT 57–70 (1948) (discussing American individualism and the Constitution). 
148 See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1467 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“‘A fundamental principle of 
our constitutional system’ is the ‘maintenance of the opportunity for free political 
discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people.’”); see 
also C. Edwin Baker, Campaign Expenditures and Free Speech, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 3 
(1998) (discussing how the Supreme Court’s privileging of political speech does not fit 
within the usual framework that does not look at the content of the speech at issue unless a 
primary concern of the First Amendment is ensuring democratic accountability). 
149 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1467 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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connection, explaining, “[s]peech does not exist in a vacuum.  Rather, 
political communication seeks to secure government action.”150  He 
further stated that when “[e]lected officials are influenced to act contrary 
to their obligations of office by the prospect of financial gain to 
themselves or infusions of money into their campaigns,” the integrity of 
the electoral process is threatened.151  Thus, Justice Breyer advances a 
view of the First Amendment, which would seek to ensure that a few 
voices cannot shout over everybody else, writing, “the First Amendment 
advances not only the individual’s right to engage in political speech, but 
also the public’s interest in preserving a democratic order in which 
collective speech matters.”152  Justice Breyer’s concerns seem particularly 
well founded given the findings of Professor Gilens and Professor 
Bartels that were discussed above and presented to the Court in Demos’ 
amicus brief.153 
Many scholars also have discussed other democratic values that are 
present within the First Amendment.154  For example, Judge J. Skelly 
Wright argued that the First Amendment contains an element of political 
equality.155  In addition, Professor Alexander has suggested that the 
government has a compelling interest in protecting the time of 
candidates and elected officials, letting them focus on governing instead 
                                                 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 1468 (quoting FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 
497 (1985)) (citing FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208 (1982); ROBERT 
POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED:  CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION 7–16, 80–94 
(2014)). 
152 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1467 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  See generally David Cole, First 
Amendment Antitrust:  The End of Laissez-Faire in Campaign Finance, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 
236, 252–71 (1991) (discussing corporate campaign spending and its impact). 
153 See generally Brief for Appellee at 1–41, McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (No. 
12-536) (citing to findings found in this particular case). 
154 See Sheri J. Engelken, Majoritarian Democracy in a Federalist System:  The Late Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and the First Amendment, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, 695, 697–98 (2007) 
(using Justice Rehnquist as an example of another scholar that discussed democratic values 
within the First Amendment). 
155 J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics:  Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to 
Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 625–31 (1982); see Jessica A. Levinson, The Original 
Sin of Campaign Finance Law:  Why Buckley v. Valeo Is Wrong, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 881, 911 
(2013) (“Had the Court properly characterized political equality as an ideal which 
promotes, rather than harms, First Amendment interests, then the Court's campaign 
finance jurisprudence would be markedly different.”). 
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of raising money.156  Furthermore, Professor Overton and others have 
advanced the value of participation.157 
To the extent that Chief Justice Roberts acknowledges the 
contribution limits present a question about democracy, he errs by 
ignoring any value other than a narrow conception of corruption.158  In 
particular, his disregard for the social science showing the domination of 
the political process by the wealthy elite reveals a mistaken underlying 
world view that campaign finance laws, such as the aggregate 
contribution limits at issue, adulterate “natural” democratic processes by 
redistributing or otherwise regulating resources that can be used to 
engage in or amplify political speech.159  Chief Justice Roberts’ analysis 
assumes that the world without campaign finance laws has a more 
legitimate and government-neutral condition.160  Accordingly, Chief 
                                                 
156 Mark C. Alexander, Let Them Do Their Jobs:  The Compelling Government Interest in 
Protecting the Time of Candidates and Elected Officials, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 669, 687–89 (2006); 
see Vincent Blasi, Democratic Participation and the Freedom of Speech:  A Response to Post and 
Weinstein, 97 VA. L. REV. 531, 534 (2011). 
157 See Spencer Overton, The Participation Interest, 100 GEO. L.J. 1259, 1277 (2012) 
[hereinafter The Participation Interest] (discussing how the Supreme Court cited 
participation as a justification for upholding campaign finance limits); see also Gregory P. 
Magarian, The Jurisprudence of Colliding First Amendment Interests:  From the Dead End of 
Neutrality to the Open Road of Participation-Enhancing Review, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 185, 
206 (2007) (addressing the challenges of campaign finance and the effect of monetary 
participation); Daniel P. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection:  On Discretion, Inequality, 
and Participation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2409, 2498 (2003) (describing the two main claims about 
political participation and the First Amendment). 
158 McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1461 (2014). 
159 See Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Strikes down Overall Political Donation Cap, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 2, 2014), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/03/us/politics/supreme-
court-ruling-on-campaign-contributions.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/RD7E-
PJV8 (“Chief Justice Roberts said that brief passage on overall limits had to be reconsidered 
in light of regulatory developments and other factors.”). 
160 See Ellen D. Katz, Election Law's Lochnerian Turn, 94 B.U. L. REV. 697, 698 (2014) 
(arguing that the Roberts court is skeptical of electoral regulations that effect political 
participation); Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 259–60 (1992) 
(arguing that First Amendment absolutists view the government as “the enemy of freedom 
of speech” and that “an effort to regulate speech is defined as a governmental attempt to 
interfere with communicative processes, taking the existing distribution of entitlements—
property rights, wealth, and so on—as a given”); Kuhner’s Book Explores Death of Campaign 
Finance Reform, GSU L. (Jul. 3, 2013), http://law.gsu.edu/2014/07/03/kuhners-new-book-
explores-death-campaign-finance-reform/, archived at http://perma.cc/GZ72-AAFL 
(“‘Blame it on the Supreme Court,’ Kuhner says. ‘No other court in the world today 
justifies plutocracy.  State and federal legislatures have acted countless times to restore 
democratic integrity and a minimum degree of political equality, but the Supreme Court 
considers civic values a threat to its free-market Constitution.’”). 
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Justice Roberts views campaign finance laws with active doubt and 
hostility.161 
The fullest expression of this bias can be seen in a case in which 
Chief Justice Roberts authored an opinion striking down part of an 
Arizona statute that provided additional matching funds to candidates 
whose competitors were particularly well-funded; a holding that relies 
on the proposition that “the prospect of more speech—responsive 
speech, competitive speech, the kind of speech that drives public 
debate—counts as a constitutional injury.”162  Several scholars and 
political commentators have analogized this stance to that of the Lochner 
Court, which aggressively struck down state wage-and-hour labor 
protections as violations of employees’ supposed liberty rights, while 
ignoring the realities of the power dynamics at issue.163 
In addition to ignoring the actual distribution of political power, 
Chief Justice Roberts disregards the government’s role in creating the 
ostensibly neutral power dynamics in the first place.164  For example, 
                                                 
161 See Katz, supra note 160, at 698 (viewing the Roberts Court as skeptical of electoral 
regulation). This hostility and skepticism is particularly odd when contrasted with the 
deference the Roberts majority gives states’ claims of electoral integrity in support of their 
voter identification laws, which actually exclude voters.  See also Joshua A. Douglas, 
(Mis)Trusting the States to Run Elections, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (forthcoming 2015), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2405396, archived at 
http://perma.cc/B7FS-95AE (stating the Supreme Court’s skepticism of federal campaign 
finance regulations). 
162 Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2837 (2011) 
(Kagan, J., dissenting). 
163 Id.; see TIMOTHY K. KUHNER, CAPITALISM V. DEMOCRACY:  MONEY IN POLITICS AND THE 
FREE MARKET CONSTITUTION 55–59 (2014) (comparing the Lochner Court decisions with 
Buckley); Karena Rahall, The Siren Is Calling:  Economic and Ideological Trends Toward 
Privatization of Public Police Forces, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 633, 654 (2014) (discussing the view 
many people have of the Lochner Court as being unconcerned with the difficulties faced by 
workers); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 874–75 (1987) 
[hereinafter Lochner’s Legacy] (discussing Lochner and its subsequent effects); David H. 
Gans, The Roberts Court Thinks Corporations Have More Rights Than You Do:  The Chief Justice 
Continues His First Amendment Revolution, NEW REPUBLIC (June 30, 2014), 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/118493/john-roberts-first-amendment-revolution-
corporations, archived at http://perma.cc/US25-UHQT (discussing how the Lochner Court 
struck down laws designed to prevent the exploitation of workers); William Greider, 
Thanks to the Roberts Court, Corporations Have More Constitutional Rights Than Actual People, 
THE NATION (May 20, 2014, 12:00 PM),  http://www.thenation.com/blog/179932/thanks-
roberts-court-corporations-have-more-constitutional-rights-actual-people, archived at 
http://perma.cc//A4XN-59XE (analogizing the Lochner Court era and its constitutional 
obstacles to progressive legislation to Chief Justice Roberts and his precedent smashing 
decisions). 
164 See Thomas B. Edsall, Supreme Injustice, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/07/opinion/edsall-supreme-injustice.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/5J9D-535R (“[T]he court has shown more concern for the First 
Amendment rights of wealthy donors than for the voting rights of minorities[,] . . . [t]he 
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income that derives from accrued wealth often is taxed at a lower rate 
than earned income—a policy that solidifies the privileged place of the 
already rich, while burdening those who are still working to accrue 
income-producing assets.165  Historically, African Americans were 
denied access to wealth-building government programs, such as 
federally supported mortgages that encouraged home ownership and 
asset accumulation.166  This is just one example of how segregation and 
discrimination in education, employment, housing, health care, criminal 
justice administration, and many other areas have created disparities in 
wealth and economic power.  These examples illustrate the ways in 
which government policies may benefit or disadvantage certain 
segments of the population, which can lead to differences in wealth—a 
difference that the Court has acknowledged can result in an individual’s 
ability to “speak more.”167 
Government policies are also the reason that more money can 
translate into more “speech.”168  A myriad of government policies work 
together to create the structure that privileges wealth in the marketplace 
of politics and ideas.169  For example, the size of the House of 
Representatives was fixed at 435 in the early part of the twentieth 
century.170  Constituencies have grown from about 30,000 in 1790 to 
about 700,000 in 2010, making the United States an outlier amongst the 
                                                                                                             
Supreme Court has made clear that it will judge attempts to restrict the monetary kind of 
‘participation’ very strictly[.]’”). 
165 See Beverly I. Moran, Capitalism and the Tax System:  A Search for Social Justice, 61 SMU 
L. REV. 337, 373 (2008) (proposing a new tax system idea which incorporates capitalism 
visions). 
166 See Reginald L. Robinson, Poverty, the Underclass, and the Role of Race Consciousness:  A 
New Age Critique of Black Wealth/White Wealth and American Apartheid, 34 IND. L. REV. 1377, 
1377, 1405–06 (2001) (critiquing MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK 
WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH:  A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY (1995) and 
DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:  SEGREGATION AND THE 
MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993)). 
167  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (“A restriction on the amount of money a 
person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily 
reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth 
of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached.”). 
168 See R. Sam Garrett, The State of Campaign Finance Policy:  Recent Developments and Issues 
for Congress, CONG. RES. SERV. (June 23, 2014), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/ 
R41542.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/CT3J-BLTT (citing McComish v. Bennett as an 
example where Chief Justice Roberts held that the “unconstitutionally burdened privately 
financed candidates’ free speech . . . did not meet a compelling state interest”). 
169 See id. (giving examples of cases through the years that formed the United States’ 
campaign finance policies). 
170 Richard Edward McLawhorn Jr., Apportionment or Size?  Why the U.S. House of 
Representatives Should Be Expanded, 62 ALA. L. REV. 1069, 1070 (2011). 
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lower houses of developed democracies.171  Larger districts tend to have 
representatives who are less accessible to the general public, highlighting 
the value of contact that can be obtained through large contributions.172  
Additionally, the prevalence of large districts means mass media 
communications are a virtual requirement to reach the electorate.173 But 
use of the airwaves is not free.174  Instead, the federal government sells 
spectrum licenses to broadcasters, creating the property rights that 
contribute to the costs of using television or radio to engage in political 
discourse.175  These examples demonstrate that there is no government-
neutral baseline democratic condition that will be restored if only 
somebody would rid us of these troublesome campaign finance laws 
(although that has not stopped Chief Justice Roberts from trying). 
Once the aggregate contribution limits were understood to present 
questions of democracy, Chief Justice Roberts should have considered 
democratic values other than quid pro quo corruption bound in the 
Constitution and our structure of government.176  In addition to those 
noted above, a host of prominent scholars have laid out a number of 
compelling democratic values and theories of government interest 
rooted in the Constitution that should be embedded in our campaign 
finance jurisprudence, including:  (1) majoritarian alignment; (2) anti-
domination; (3) anti-oligarchy; (4) dependence corruption; (5) equality; 
(6) participation; and (7) structural corruption.177  It is not within the 
                                                 
171 Amber Wichowsky, District Size Matters:  The Representational Costs of Too Many 
Constituents, 9 ELECTION L.J. 231, 231 (2010) (reviewing BRIAN FREDERICK, CONGRESSIONAL 
REPRESENTATION & CONSTITUENTS:  THE CASE FOR INCREASING THE U.S. HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES (2010)). 
172 See id. at 232 (“House members representing larger constituents ‘have a more difficult 
time meeting the policy and service demands of the citizens in their districts.’”); Byron J. 
Harden, House of the Rising Population:  The Case for Eliminating the 435-Member Limit on the 
U.S. House of Representatives, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 73, 93 (2011) (discussing the rising 
population within the U.S. House of Representatives and eliminating the member number 
limit); Christopher M. Straw, The Role of Electoral Accountability in the Madisonian Machine, 11 
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 321, 355 (2008) (addressing the political ideals of federal 
government brought forth by James Madison). 
173 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (holding that provisions limiting individual 
contributions were constitutional and did not violate the First Amendment). 
174 Julian Hattem, Broadcasters:  Airwave Auction Contains Message for FCC, THE HILL (Dec. 
11, 2014, 5:38 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/technology/226878-broadcasters-airwave-
auction-contains-message-for-fcc, archived at http://perma.cc/992N-ZF9H. 
175 See Sunstein, supra note 160, at 272 (evaluating the current system of free speech and 
expression). 
176 See DAVID SCHULTZ, ELECTION LAW AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 47–50 (2014) 
(describing the different values under the theory of democracy). 
177 See Yasmin Dawood, The Antidomination Model and the Judicial Oversight of Democracy, 
96 GEO. L.J. 1411, 1416 (2008) (proposing the antidomination model that deals with judicial 
oversight of democratic politics); Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy 
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purview of this Article to fully consider and analyze these bases for more 
effective government action to cabin the influence of money on our 
democratic self-government, it is instead the job of the Court.  
Furthermore, the Court’s jurisprudence on money in politics will never 
be well grounded until it expressly grapples with and fully articulates 
the theory of democracy that underlies its interpretation of the 
Constitution. 
C. The McCutcheon Plurality’s Approach is Not Applied Consistently 
The Roberts Court approach might be more easily explained if Chief 
Justice Roberts were simply a First Amendment absolutist who hews 
literally to the notion that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech.”178  In McCutcheon, Chief Justice Roberts attempts to 
cast himself in this light.179  But, as Professor Teachout pointed out, 
outside of the campaign finance realm, Chief Justice Roberts willingly 
engages in a First Amendment analysis that carefully balances the real-
world harms of certain expressive conduct with the importance of 
ensuring freedom of speech.180  In McCutcheon, however, Chief Justice 
                                                                                                             
Constitution, 94 B.U. L. REV. 669, 670 (2014) (addressing the principles of oligarchy and class 
inequality); Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter:  A Constitutional Principle of Campaign 
Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204, 1206 (1994) (arguing for constitutional law to require 
equal-dollars-per-voter); Lawrence Lessig, What an Originalist Would Understand 
"Corruption" to Mean, 102 CAL. L. REV. 1, 2 (2014) (claiming that an institution can be corrupt 
regardless of whether or not its members are corrupt); The Participation Interest, supra note 
157, at 1259 (discussing the interests in citizen participation in financing politics and giving 
them more influence); Pasquale, supra note 39, at 602 (advocating for a democratic process 
that protects against one group accumulating too much influence in the political field); 
Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, The Constitutional Imperative and Practical Superiority of 
Democratically Financed Elections, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1160, 1160 (1994) (proposing a total 
public financing of congressional campaigns); Stephanopoulos, supra note 43, at 304 
(discussing democratic theory and its approach to alignment); Zephyr Teachout, 
Constitutional Purpose and the Anti-Corruption Principle, 108 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 200, 201 
(2014) (addressing how courts should distinguish between competing constitutional 
purposes). 
178 U.S. CONST. amend. I; see Solveig Singleton, Reviving A First Amendment Absolutism for 
the Internet, 3 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 279, 290 (1999) (arguing in favor of a more absolutist 
interpretation of the First Amendment). 
179 McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1451 (2014).  The Court states: 
The line between quid pro quo corruption and general influence may 
seem vague at times, but the distinction must be respected in order to 
safeguard basic First Amendment rights. In addition, “[i]n drawing 
that line, the First Amendment requires us to err on the side of 
protecting political speech rather than suppressing it.” 
Id. 
180 See Zephyr Teachout, Constitutional Change and Manageable Standards, HUFF. POST:  
POLITICS (Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/zephyr-teachout/bob-bauer-
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Roberts disregards the real-world harms of striking the aggregate 
contribution limit.181  Nor does the Chief Justice refuse to find against the 
First Amendment rights of speakers in certain contexts.182 
More generally, Chief Justice Roberts’ approach to campaign finance 
is riddled with inconsistencies.183  For example, Professor Hasen has 
questioned whether Citizens United can be squared with Caperton v. A.T. 
Massey Coal Co., Inc., in which the Court held that recusal was required 
“when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a 
significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the 
case by raising funds or directing the judge's election campaign when the 
case was pending or imminent.”184  Likewise, Chief Justice Roberts’s 
commitment to the value of unbridled speech even in the context of 
campaign finance is difficult to square with Bluman v. FEC, in which the 
Court summarily affirmed an appellate court decision upholding a ban 
on campaign contributions from foreign nationals.185 
                                                                                                             
and-constitutio_b_4690394.html, archived at http://perma.cc/U58T-QKLL (discussing 
Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010), which 
upheld a federal statute prohibiting the provision of material support or resources to 
certain foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activity). 
181 See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1465–66 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Taken together with 
Citizens United . . . today’s decision eviscerates our Nations campaign finance laws, leaving 
a remnant incapable of dealing with the grave problems of democratic legitimacy that 
those laws were intended to resolve.”).  
182 See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 393 (2007) (holding that a minor child in a 
school setting was not free to hold a sign saying “Bong hits 4 Jesus”); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 
547 U.S. 410, 410 (2006) (holding that speech by a government employee pursuant to his 
public position is not protected by the First Amendment). 
183 See Chief Justice Roberts, Voting Rights, and Campaign Finance:  Easier to Donate, Harder to 
Vote, CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY CTR. (Nov. 11, 2014), 
http://theusconstitution.org/media/releases/chief-justice-roberts-voting-rights-and-
campaign-finance-easier-donate-harder-vote, archived at http://perma.cc/3LUQ-8Z25 
(“There is no constitutional right that is guaranteed in more provisions of the Constitution 
than the right to vote, but in [Roberts’] view, the right to contribute is on par with the right 
to vote.”). 
184 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 884 (2009); Richard L. Hasen, Citizens 
United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581, 606, 610, 612 (2011). 
185 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 292 (D.D.C. 2011), aff'd, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012); Rick Hasen, 
Breaking News:  Supreme Court Affirms that First Amendment Not Violated by Barring Foreign 
Individuals from Spending Money (or Contributing) in U.S. Elections, ELECTION L. BLOG (Jan. 9, 
2012, 7:38 AM), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=27557, archived at http://perma.cc/U3VX-
2GMW. 
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D. Chief Justice Roberts Has Shifted the Campaign Finance Analytical 
Framework, Privileging the Right of the Powerful to Use Their Resources to 
Influence Policy-Making Over the Right of the Public to Participate 
In the wake of Wisconsin Right to Life v. FEC, Professor Hill 
presciently identified an important shift—authored by Chief Justice 
Roberts—in the Supreme Court’s approach to its campaign finance 
jurisprudence as compared to its approach in McConnell v. FEC, which 
was issued just four years earlier.186  Professor Hill explains that the 
McConnell Court used a “democratic integrity framework” with a 
“public participation agenda” that viewed the use of campaign 
contributions and expenditures to gain access to and influence with 
policy decision-makers as corrupt.187  But, in Wisconsin Right to Life, Chief 
Justice Roberts’s majority opinion set forth a new framework that treated 
the campaign finance issues under a “political speech framework” with a 
“corporate political speech agenda,” resulting in characterizations of 
campaign finance regulations as speech bans that unconstitutionally 
burdened the rights of corporations to spend their general treasury 
funds to influence the political process.188  The seed of this new 
framework ripened in the Citizens United decision and flowered in 
McCutcheon.189 
In McCutcheon, one sees this same framework, only with wealthy 
contributors subbing in for the corporate party in Wisconsin Right to 
Life.190  Again, Chief Justice Roberts appears to have a special solicitude 
for the ostensible right of powerful interests to use their monetary 
resources to influence the political process.191  For example, Chief Justice 
Roberts’s opening lines equate campaign contributions with voting as 
though they were normatively similar types of democratic 
engagement.192  Similarly, he later equates contributors with voting 
constituents.193 
                                                 
186 Frances R. Hill, Corporate Political Speech and the Balance of Powers:  A New Framework for 
Campaign Finance Jurisprudence in Wisconsin Right to Life, 27 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 267, 
269 (2008). 
187 Id. 
188 Id. at 268. 
189 See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462 (2014) (citing the Court’s holding). 
190 See id. (analyzing the Court’s reasoning). 
191 Id. 
192 Id. at 1440–41. 
193 Id. at 1461–62; see Joey Fishkin, Who is a Constituent?, BALKINIZATION (Apr. 30, 2014, 
5:58 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/04/who-is-constituent.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/3A9F-RRKC (discussing Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion in the McCutcheon 
case and the definition of constituency). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 2 [2015], Art. 11
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol49/iss2/11
2015] McCutcheon v. FEC, and Why It Matters 565 
In applying the political speech framework with this agenda, Chief 
Justice Roberts effectively tears down traditional barriers between the 
economic and political spheres.194  In a recent commentary, Professor 
Stone gives a few examples that highlight the absurdity of breaking 
down this division, which would result in letting economic power enable 
the wealthy to exercise additional political power.195  For example, he 
suggests that it would be ridiculous if a rich candidate complained that 
giving equal time in a debate to all of the competitors was unfair and 
unconstitutional because the rich candidate was prevented from buying 
additional debate time.196  Professor Stone’s examples culminate in a 
hypothetical in which wealthy individuals or corporations argue that 
they should be allowed to purchase additional votes for $100 per vote.197  
In other words, virtually everybody—even Chief Justice Roberts, who 
has never publicly questioned the constitutionality of prohibiting the 
selling of votes—agrees that there are areas of the political sphere in 
which individuals are rightly prohibited from using their money to fully 
express their views due to concerns of undemocratic domination.198 
V.  AFTER MCCUTCHEON:  WHERE ARE WE NOW AND WHERE ARE WE 
GOING? 
This Article demonstrates that the Roberts Court embarked on a 
radical deregulatory project in the area of money in politics, striking 
down laws meant to promote participation, representation, and 
accountability while fighting corruption, domination, and alienation.199  
                                                 
194 See The Democracy We Left Behind, supra note 17, at 1–2 (discussing how the Court’s 
Establishment Clause and campaign finance jurisprudence interacts); McCutcheon, 134 S. 
Ct. at 1441 (citing and invoking Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Snyder v. Phelps, 131 
S. Ct. 1207 (2011); Nat’l Socialist Party of Am. v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977) (per curiam)); see 
also MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE:  A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 100 
(Basic Books, Inc. 1983) (“Political power and influence cannot be bought and sold.”); 
Michael J. Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy:  The Moral Limits of Markets, TANNER LECTURES ON 
HUMAN VALUES 93–94 (May 11–12, 1998), http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-
to-z/s/sandel00.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9HE8-R72C (illustrating the powerful 
social and political tendencies of today).  
195 Geoffrey R. Stone, The First Amendment Doesn’t Protect the Right to Buy the American 
Government, THE DAILY BEAST (April 5, 2014), http://www.thedailybeast.com/ 
articles/2014/04/05/the-first-amendment-doesn-t-protect-the-right-to-buy-the-american-
government.html, archived at http://perma.cc/E7C4-2A2L. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. 
198 Landell v. Sorrell, 406 F.3d 159, 160–61 (2d Cir. 2005) (Calabresi, J., concurring in 
denial of rehearing en banc), amended (Apr. 20, 2005)). 
199 See Jeffrey Toobin, The John Roberts Project, NEW YORKER (Apr. 2, 2014), available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-john-roberts-project, archived at 
http://perma.cc/AT5V-LC9F (discussing Chief Justice Roberts’ project). 
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These changes in the law allow economically powerful people and 
interests to have a much greater voice in electoral outcomes and policy 
choices than non-wealthy Americans.  This leads to serious problems for 
the integrity and legitimacy of our democracy and for the public policies 
that affect people’s lives.  But while much damage has been done, there 
are reasons to be hopeful that we are reaching a crucial turning point 
that will allow jurisprudential shifts and policy changes to progress 
together.  There is powerful, widespread disagreement with the Court’s 
current approach, which has only grown since Citizens United and 
McCutcheon.200 
Even as things stand within the current constrained understanding 
of constitutionally allowed restraints on rules for money in politics, there 
are many policy solutions available to counter the improper influence of 
money in politics.  Voluntary public financing programs enhance the 
voice of small donors and promote constituent contact, contribution and 
other limits fight corruption and capture (and its appearance), and 
disclosure requirements provide voters with critical information with 
which to make decisions and hold political actors accountable. 
But it is important to recognize that in the long term we must change 
the constitutional understanding of the protections for the use of money 
to gain and exercise political influence.  We must reject the First 
Amendment fundamentalism that precludes consideration of democratic 
values that are central to the goals and role of the First Amendment and 
our constitutional structure of a self-governing republic.  The Supreme 
Court must adopt a constitutional understanding that empowers people 
to limit the improper influence of money in politics and places people, 
not money, at the center of our democracy. 
A. McCutcheon Has Caused Policy Changes, but Effective Policies Remain 
Constitutional 
1. In the Wake of McCutcheon, States Have Abandoned Aggregate 
Contribution Limits 
In the plurality opinion in McCutcheon, Chief Justice Roberts noted 
that eight states have statutes setting aggregate contribution limits.201  
                                                 
200 See Linda Greenhouse, An Indecent Burial, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/17/opinion/an-indecent-burial.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/SW6R-HJ6F (analyzing the different approaches Chief Justice Roberts 
applied in both Citizens United and McCutcheon). 
201 McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1451–52 & n.7 (2013) (listing the eight states:  
Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, Rhode Island, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming). 
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Although not mentioned by Chief Justice Roberts, the District of 
Columbia and Kentucky also have similar statutes.202  Within four 
months after the McCutcheon decision, state officials from each of these 
polities expressed their understanding that the statutes are no longer 
enforceable or will be repealed.203  Additionally, the Vermont legislature 
passed aggregate contribution limits, but the statute delayed 
implementation until after the McCutcheon decision was issued and had 
a provision invalidating the limits if the analogous federal laws were 
found to be unconstitutional.204 
                                                 
202 D.C. CODE § 1-1131.01(b), (d) (repealed 2014); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 121.150(10) (West 
2014). 
203 Anthony J. Castagno, Advisory Opinion 2014-03:  Application and Enforcement of 
Connecticut’s Aggregate Contribution Limits from Individuals to Candidates and Committees After 
McCutcheon, ST. OF CONN. ST. ELECTIONS ENFORCEMENT COMM’N (May 14, 2014), available 
at http://www.ct.gov/seec/lib/seec/laws_and_regulations/ao_2014-03.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/X67K-NS6M; MATT NESE, STATE AGGREGATE LIMITS AND PROPORTIONAL 
BANS UNDER MCCUTCHEON:  LIKELY UNCONSTITUTIONAL OR HIGHLY VULNERABLE 12 (July 
2014) (citing Letter from Irvin B. Nathan, Attorney General, to David Keating, May 21, 
2014), available at http://www.campaignfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/2014-
10-22_Issue-Review_McCutcheon_State-Aggregate-Limits-And-Proportional-Bans-Under-
McCutcheon.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ED83-ZHBH; Emily Dennis, Advisory 
Opinion 2014-003, KEN. REGIS. OF ELECTION FIN. (Jun. 5, 2014), available at 
http://kref.ky.gov/Contributions/2014_003_Opinion.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/FJ5A-JC9X; Policy Statement of the Maine Ethics Commission on Enforceability 
of Aggregate Contribution Limits, ST. OF ME. COMM’N ON GOVERNMENTAL ETHICS & ELECTION 
PRACS. (2014), available at http://www.maine.gov/ethics/pdf/ProposedStatement 
NottoEnforceAggLimit.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/KX8A-KVHT; Bobbie S. Mack et 
al., Contribution Limits, MD. ST. BD. OF ELECTIONS (Apr. 11, 2014), available at 
http://elections.maryland.gov/campaign_finance/documents/aggregate_limits_04112014
_final.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/X4N6-3V3B; OCPF’s Statement on Today’s Supreme 
Court Decision, McCutcheon vs. FEC, MASS. OFFICE OF CAMPAIGN AND POL. FIN. (Apr. 2, 
2014), available at http://www.campaignfreedom.org/2014/07/08/uneforceable-states-
respond-to-mccutcheon-and-support-the-first-amendment/, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
X5HZ-QKCX; Michael Gormley, State:  No Limit on Individual Political Donations, NEWSDAY 
(May 26, 2014), available at http://www.newsday.com/long-island/politics/state-no-limit-
on-individual-political-donations-1.8186788, archived at http://perma.cc/VQ8X-MHJW; 
Michael P. McKinney, R.I. Board of Elections Backs Repeal of ‘Total’ Campaign Contribution 
Limit, R.I. PROVIDENCE J. (Apr. 17, 2014), available at http://www.providencejournal.com/ 
breaking-news/content/20140417-r.i.-board-of-elections-backs-repeal-of-total-campaign-
contribution-limit.ece, archived at http://perma.cc/46GJ-5UB7; Order at 1, Young v. Vocke 
(E.D. Wis. May 22, 2014) (No. 13-CV-635), available at http://gab.wi.gov/ 
sites/default/files/news/young_v_vocke_dkt_12_order_pdf_80804.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/S7NL-S6BH; Laura Hancock, Wyoming Lawmakers Want to Repeal Caps to 
PAC Spending, CASPER STAR TRIB. (Jun. 6, 2014), available at http://trib.com/news/state-
and-regional/govt-and-politics/wyoming-lawmakers-want-to-repeal-caps-to-pac-
spending/article_9a4c8196-d5ff-5eb3-a99b-a53214e8e8d7.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/WGM8-NZV5. 
204 See 17 VT. STAT. ANN. § 2941 (West 2014) (providing the limitations of contributions 
for candidates running for State Representative, State Senator, local office, county office, or 
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2. Other Policies are Under Attack from Opponents of Campaign 
Finance Regulations Emboldened by the Decision 
As discussed above, the plurality decision in McCutcheon, 
particularly when coupled with the Citizens United decision, marks a 
dramatic shift in the Court’s approach to campaign finance 
regulations.205  It was the first time that the Court entirely invalidated a 
category of limits that had been upheld in Buckley.206  It was also only the 
second time that a federal contribution limit was invalidated.207  
Illustrating the potential for change, a state court judge even cited 
McCutcheon in support of overturning decades-old precedent.208  Perhaps 
in response to the Roberts Court’s apparent hostility towards campaign 
finance regulations, a number of new cases have been filed, challenging 
the policies that remain.  Additionally, litigants in pending cases have 
attempted to apply McCutcheon’s reasoning. 
There have been several lawsuits challenging different types of 
contribution limits.209  For example, the Republican National Committee 
                                                                                                             
for the office of Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, State Treasurer, Auditor 
of Accounts, or Attorney General). 
205 See supra Part IV.A (discussing the Court’s rejection of prior case law regarding 
aggregate limits and the governmental interest in preventing corruption); see also Jonathan 
S. Berkon & Marc E. Elias, After McCutcheon, 127 HARV. L. REV. 373, 379 (2014) (addressing 
the consequences after the Supreme Court’s McCutcheon decision). 
206 See Fred Wertheimer, The McCutcheon Case:  The Legal and Political Consequences If the 
Supreme Court Strikes down Overall Contribution Limits, DEMOCRACY 21 (Feb. 24, 2014), 
http://www.democracy21.org/inside-the-courts/press-releases-inside-the-courts/the-
mccutcheon-casethe-legal-and-political-consequences-if-the-supreme-court-strikes-down-
overall-contribution-limits, archived at http://perma.cc/A4YQ-B2F9 (discussing the legal 
and political consequences of ruling against contribution limits in campaigns); Georgina 
Yeomans, Reactions to McCutcheon from a Law Student, ACS BLOG (Apr. 4, 2014), 
http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/all/mccutcheon-v.-federal-election-commission, archived 
at http://perma.cc/QP4G-72QM (reacting to the Court’s decision in McCutcheon). 
207 See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 231 (2003) (striking down BCRA’s prohibition on 
contributions from minors). 
208 New Jersey v. Buckner, 96 A.3d 261, 280–81 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014) (Harris, 
J.A.D., dissenting) (discussing a challenge to a thirty-nine-year-old statute that authorizes 
the New Jersey Supreme Court to recall retired judges for temporary service, including 
those who have reached age seventy). 
209 See, e.g., Complaint at 1, N.Y. Republican State Comm. v. SEC (D.D.C. Aug. 7, 2014) 
(No. 1:14-cv-01345), available at http://www.skadden.com/newsletters/NY_Republicans_ 
v_SEC_-_P2P_Complaint.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3Y7K-M4B6 (challenging a 
regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission as violating the Administration 
Procedure Act and the First Amendment); Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 1, Holmes v. 
FEC (D.D.C. July 21, 2014) (No. 1:14-cv-01243), available at http://www.campaign 
freedom.org/2014/07/21/holmes-v.-fec-complaint/, archived at http://perma.cc/BK2C-
HEWJ (challenging the bifurcated contribution limits under the Federal Election Campaign 
Act); Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Republican Nat’l 
Comm. v. FEC (D.D.C. May 23, 2014) (No. 1:14-cv-00853), available at http://www.fec. 
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and the Republican Party of Louisiana state committee challenged BCRA 
provisions that prohibit national and state political party committees 
from forming non-contribution accounts, which could accept unlimited 
contributions into a “separate bank account for the purpose of financing 
independent expenditures, other advertisements that refer to a Federal 
candidate, and generic voter drives.”210  Additionally, the Center for 
Competitive Politics identified ten states that have contribution limits 
that might be vulnerable under the reasoning of the McCutcheon 
plurality, such as Hawaii’s prohibition on candidates accepting more 
than 30% of their contributions from non-residents.211  And, in assessing 
Minnesota’s special-sources contribution limits, which were also 
identified by the Center for Competitive Politics as being vulnerable, a 
federal district court relied on McCutcheon to enjoin the regulations 
despite voicing reservations about the wisdom of the precedent.212 
                                                                                                             
gov/law/litigation/rnc_rnc_complaint.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/LT3J-SCHC 
(challenging the provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 regarding the 
First Amendment); Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Rufer v. 
FEC (D.D.C. May 21, 2014) (No. 1:14-cv-00837-CRC), available at http://www.fec.gov/ 
law/litigation/rufer_rufer_complaint.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/M55G-NU7P 
(challenging the independent expenditure of a “non-connected” political party); 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 3, Wills v. 
Mead (D. Wy. July 2, 2014) (No. 2:14-cv-00126), available at http://wyliberty.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/WillsvMead-PI-Memo.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/PK6S-
LWFZ (challenging that a statute under the Wyoming Election Code restrains political 
speech and violates the First Amendment); Decision and Order on Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction at 1, Woodhouse v. Me. Comm’n on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices 
(D. Me. Aug. 22, 2014) (No. 14-cv-266), available at http://scholar.google.com/ 
scholar_case?case=14284777011250628071&q=woodhouse+v.+maine+commission+on+gov
ernmental+ethics+and+election+practices&hl=en&as_sdt=800006&as_vis=1, archived at 
http://perma.cc/3P2T-7LNS (arguing for a preliminary injunction ordering Maine to 
permit its residents to double their contributions  for independent candidates for 
governor). 
210 Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 8, Republican Nat’l 
Comm. v. FEC (D.D.C. May 23, 2014) (No. 1:14-cv-00853), available at http://www.fec. 
gov/press/Press2011/20111006postcarey.shtm, archived at http://perma.cc/J82H-ZG5E 
(quoting Press Release, FEC Statement on Carey v. FEC, Reporting Guidance for Political 
Committees that Maintain a Non–Contribution Account (Oct. 5, 2011)). 
211 Matt Nese, State Aggregate Limits and Proportional Bans Under McCutcheon:  Likely 
Unconstitutional or Highly Vulnerable, CTR. FOR COMPETITIVE POLITICS (July 8, 2014), 
http://www.campaignfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/2014-07-08_Issue-
Review_McCutcheon_State-Aggregate-Limits-And-Proportional-Bans-Under-
McCutcheon.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6MK3-UV9B (describing seven different 
types of contribution limits in Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Louisiana, 
Minnesota, Montana, South Carolina, and Tennessee). 
212 See Seaton v. Wiener, 2014 WL 2081898, at *5 (D. Minn. May 19, 2014) (“While the 
Court may not agree with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the First Amendment in 
this regard, and echoes the concerns of other courts that have addressed similar issues in 
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Additionally, notwithstanding the McCutcheon plurality’s positive 
take on disclosure, these regulations have been challenged—perhaps 
because they are one of the last remaining bulwarks.213  For example, 
Citizens United has challenged New York’s requirement that non-profit 
corporations must file IRS Form 990 Schedule B, which lists contributors 
before they may engage in solicitation or advocacy in the state.214 
But McCutcheon does not appear to provide new ammunition with 
which to attack disclosure regulations, as several courts have cited it for 
its approval of such requirements.215  For example, in a case before the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, Stop This Insanity 
argued that FECA provisions preventing its segregated fund from 
soliciting the entire public while concealing its expenses for such 
solicitation were unconstitutional.216  The appellate court affirmed the 
dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint and the denial of its motion for 
preliminary judgment, in part, noting that McCutcheon “endorsed 
disclosure as ‘a particularly effective means of arming the voting public 
with information.’”217  Other campaign finance policies, such as the 
federal pay-to-play ban and anti-coordination rules, that have been and 
will continue to be challenged, will likely have to address the 
McCutcheon plurality’s decision as well.218 
                                                                                                             
light of McCutcheon, the Court is nonetheless bound by the decisions of the Supreme 
Court.”). 
213 See Jennifer A. Heerwig & Katherine Shaw, Through a Glass, Darkly:  The Rhetoric and 
Reality of Campaign Finance Disclosure, 102 GEO. L.J. 1443, 1445 (2014) (arguing an 
inconsistency in FEC’s compliance with disclosure regimes). 
214 Citizens United v. Schneiderman, No. 1:2014cv03704 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2014); see also 
Citizens United v. Scott Gessler et al., No. 14-cv-02266 (D. Co. Aug. 14, 2014) (challenging 
the applicability of Colorado’s disclosure requirements to the organization). 
215 See Libertarian Party of Ohio v. Husted, 751 F.3d 403, 420 (6th Cir. 2014) (explaining 
disclosure requirements); Democratic Governors Ass'n v. Brandi, 2014 WL 2589279, at *20 
(D. Conn. June 10, 2014) (“[C]ourts . . . have not found the additional reporting and 
organizational burdens that accompany political committee registration to be 
unconstitutional . . .”); Stop This Insanity, Inc. Emp. Leadership Fund v. FEC, 2014 WL 
3824225, at *1, *6 (D.C.C. Aug. 5, 2014) (discussing that the Federal Election Campaign Act 
permitted limited corporate participation). 
216 Stop This Insanity, Inc., 2014 WL 3824225, at *1–2. 
217 Id. at *6 (quoting McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1460 (2014)). 
218 See Wagner v. FEC, 717 F.3d 1007, 1009 (D.D.C. 2013) (summarizing Wagner v. FEC 
and the U.S. District Court’s upholding of the Federal Election Campaign Act’s prohibition 
on federal contractors’ contributions to federal elections); O'Keefe v. Schmitz, 19 F. Supp. 
3d 861, 868 (E.D. Wis. May 6, 2014), rev’d O’Keefe v. Chisholm, 769 F.3d 936 (7th Cir. 2014) 
(addressing the scope of the Court’s preliminary injunction against continuing to conduct 
the John Doe investigation). 
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3. Campaign Finance Policies Such as Base Contribution Limits, 
Disclosure, and Public Financing Remain Constitutional 
Notwithstanding Chief Justice Roberts’ deregulatory project and the 
anti-reformers’ litigation activity, several important campaign finance 
policy options remain constitutional—most notably, base contribution 
limits, disclosure, and public financing. And, therefore, it is vitally 
important that the public fights to protect these laws.219 
In McCutcheon, the plurality reaffirmed the continuing vitality of the 
federal base contribution limits.220  Only six states do not have campaign 
contribution limits.221  These policies help limit the influence of big 
money on legislative outputs and make elections more competitive, 
enhancing the government’s accountability to each citizen.222  
Additionally, the McCutcheon plurality wrote approvingly of disclosure 
regulations.223  Every single state requires some disclosure of 
contributions and expenditures.224  Such disclosure is understood to 
                                                 
219 Richard L. Hasen, Three Wrong Progressive Approaches (and One Right One) to Campaign 
Finance Reform, 8 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 21, 34 (2014) (“To begin with, it is important to 
defend what remains of campaign finance law, and to continue pursuing and defending 
legislation within the confines of Supreme Court precedent.”). 
220 McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1451 (2014) (“Such rhetoric ignores the fact that 
we leave the base limits undisturbed.  Those base limits remain the primary means of 
regulating campaign contributions . . . .”). 
221 See State Limits on Contributions to Candidates, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Oct. 
2013), http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/legismgt/Limits_to_Candidates_2012-
2014.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc.GK6L-SV4P (using a chart to illustrate corporate to 
candidate contribution limits by state).  
222 Daniel H. Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform:  The Root of All Evil is Deeply 
Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 301, 313–14 (1989).  Mr. Lowenstein reports: 
Some of these studies have reported no statistically significant 
relationship between PAC contributions to House members and their 
votes on bills of interest to the PACs; some have reported unavoidably 
ambiguous results; some have reported statistically significant but modest 
effects; and some have reported effects both substantial and statistically 
significant. 
 Id. (emphasis added); see also Deborah Goldberg & Brenda Wright, Defending Campaign 
Contribution Limits After Randall v. Sorrell, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 661, 688 (2008) 
(“Primo et al. also conclude that ‘individual contribution limits have a large, statistically 
significant, and negative effect on the size of the winning vote margin [of gubernatorial 
candidates], implying an increase in competitiveness.’”). 
223 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1459–60 (“Disclosure requirements burden speech, but—
unlike the aggregate limits—they do not impose a ceiling on speech.  For that reason, 
disclosure often represents a less restrictive alternative to flat bans on certain types or 
quantities of speech.”  (internal citations omitted)). 
224 Campaign Finance Reform: An Overview, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Oct. 3, 
2011), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/campaign-finance-an-
overview.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/F89B-J944. 
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contribute to an informed electorate.225  A recent study found evidence 
that “states with more stringent campaign finance disclosure 
requirements weigh citizens’ opinions more equally in the policymaking 
process.”226  As such, this set of policies might even be an area ripe for 
expansion.227  For example, in the federal system, agencies other than the 
FEC—such as the Securities Exchange Commission—could require the 
disclosure of funds used to influence elections.228 
Although not at issue in McCutcheon, public financing remains a key 
tool to democratize the influence of money in politics.229  Fourteen states, 
in addition to some municipalities, provide some level of financial 
support to candidates who voluntarily agree to abide by certain 
spending and fundraising restrictions.230  These programs keep 
candidates in contact with their constituencies, not just their large 
donors, while promoting participation.231  They combat corruption and 
its appearance, but also can enhance electoral competition.232  After 
recognizing these benefits, there are efforts to introduce such schemes at 
all levels of government.233 
                                                 
225 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (finding that disclosure allows voters to 
place value on candidates rather than by political party).  See generally Michael D. Gilbert, 
Campaign Finance Disclosure and the Information Tradeoff, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1847, 1858–60 
(2013) (explaining that disclosure helps voters to vote more competently). 
226 Patrick Flavin, State Campaign Finance Laws and the Equality of Political Representation, 
BAYLOR BLOG (Oct. 16, 2014), http://blogs.baylor.edu/patrick_j_flavin/files/2010/09/ 
Flavin_ELJ-1vsh6bv.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/XFP7-XT9C. 
227 See Heerwig & Shaw, supra note 213, at 1446 (“Expanding disclosure is 
unquestionably critical if disclosure is to achieve the lofty goals we have assigned to it.”). 
228 Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, The SEC and Dark Political Money:  An Historical Argument for 
Requiring Disclosure, CORP. REFORM COAL. 5 (June 18, 2013), available at 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/sec-dark-political-money-history-report.pdf, archived 
at http://perma.cc/W229-QTTF. 
229 Dollars and Sense:  How Undisclosed Money and Post-McCutcheon Campaign Finance Will 
Affect the 2014 Election and Beyond, Submitted to the United States Senate Comm. on Rules 
and Admin. (Apr. 30, 2014) (testimony of Liz Kennedy, Counsel, Demos), 
http://www.demos.org/publication/dollars-and-sense-how-undisclosed-money-and-
post-mccutcheon-campaign-finance-will-affect, archived at http://perma.cc/F5KZ-C9YN. 
230 See Public Financing of Campaigns:  An Overview, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 
23, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/public-financing-of-
campaigns-overview.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/QB29-5ZQK (using a table to graph 
candidate public financing programs). 
231 Monica Youn, Small-Donor Public Financing in the Post-Citizens United Era, 44 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 619, 634–35 (2011). 
232 Id. at 629–34; see David Gartner, The Future of Clean Elections, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 733, 737–
39 (2013) (describing early experience in Arizona with public financing scheme). 
233 See, e.g., Lynn Thompson, Seattle City Council Considers Public Financing of Campaigns, 
SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 30, 2013, 8:45 PM), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/ 
2020251169_campaignfinancexml.html, archived at http://perma.cc/X3CQ-PJUA 
(discussing Seattle’s consideration of a public financing program); Government by the People 
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These policies are not necessarily magic bullets that will cure all of 
the problems of concentrated wealth’s impact on democratic 
government.  They should be understood to work with each other, as 
necessary but not necessarily sufficient, parts of an effective 
comprehensive system of common sense rules for money in politics.  But, 
while the longer-term process of overturning the Roberts Court’s flawed 
campaign finance jurisprudence proceeds, at minimum, they are 
important interim measures that should be protected and promoted. 
4. Strong Public Demand for Comprehensive Structural Change Might 
Result in a Constitutional Amendment 
The campaign finance decisions of the Roberts Court also prompted 
calls for amending the Constitution.234  Currently, about two-thirds of 
the American public supports an amendment.235  Legislators then heeded 
this call with the introduction of a bill in the U.S. Senate that has been 
sponsored by nearly fifty senators.236  The amendment stipulates that 
“[t]o advance the fundamental principle of political equality for all, and 
to protect the integrity of the legislative and electoral processes, 
Congress shall have the power to regulate the raising and spending of 
money and in-kind equivalents with respect to Federal 
elections . . . [.]”237 
Such a strategy is broadly in line with our country’s history.  The 
Constitution has been amended several times to overturn Court 
precedent that was inconsistent with constitutional principles—as is the 
                                                                                                             
Act of 2014, H.R. 20, 113th Cong. (2014), available at http://congressional.proquest.com/ 
congressional/docview/t01.d02.113_hr_20_ih?accountid=14811, archived at 
http://perma.cc/UVZ5-HLX (explaining federal public financing bill introduced by 
Representative Sarbanes). 
234 Stephen Dinan, Senate Democrats Declare War on Roberts’ Supreme Court, Campaign 
Finance Freedoms, WASH. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/ 
news/2014/apr/30/senate-dems-vow-vote-change-constitution/?page=all, archived at 
http://perma.cc/8YCS-CQ2Q. 
235 Daniel Weissglass, Poll Shows Strong Support for Constitutional Amendment Reining in 
Big Money, COMMON CAUSE (July 31, 2014), http://www.commoncause.org/democracy-
wire/new-poll-shows-strong-public-support-for-controlling-big-money-in-politics.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/7Z7X-KAYB (“[65%] of voters believe that the current 
campaign finance system is unacceptable”). 
236 See S.J. Res. 19, 113th Cong. (2013) (providing the text of the bill); see also S.J. Res. 19–A 
Joint Resolution Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the United States Relating to 
Contributions and Expenditures Intended to Affect Elections, CONGRESS.GOV (2013), 
https://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-joint-resolution/19/cosponsors, 
archived at http://perma.cc/7EA-U45E (providing the cosponsors to the bill). 
237 S.J. Res. 19, § 1, 113th Cong. (2013). 
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Roberts Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence.238  And, although the 
road to a constitutional amendment is arduous, even unsuccessful 
constitutional amendment campaigns can help bring about 
jurisprudential evolution in the Court itself.239 
B. Reformers Can Reclaim the Constitutional Foundations to Support 
Democracy-Enhancing Campaign Finance Regulations 
Despite the hostility of the Roberts Court to campaign finance 
regulations, it is helpful to remember that it is only with the departure of 
Justice O’Connor that the Court has adopted such an extreme anti-
regulation approach, breaking with a wider body of precedent.240  
Accordingly, we should not discount the possibility that progressive 
change is equally possible.  Such a constitutional correction might take 
the form of a shift in the Court’s jurisprudence, returning to 
interpretations of the Constitution and First Amendment that envision a 
democracy in which the size of a person’s wallet does not determine the 
impact of her voice or his right to representation.241 
1. The Court Has Reversed Course to Correct Bad Decisions of Crucial 
National Importance 
The Supreme Court has come to reconsider its positions on issues of 
fundamental importance to our nation before.  For example, in 1896, the 
Court in Plessy v. Ferguson approved the constitutionality of the doctrine 
and practice of “separate but equal.”242  There, the Court interpreted the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the law to 
allow the government to discriminate on the basis of race in the 
                                                 
238 Joan Schaffner, The Federal Marriage Amendment:  To Protect the Sanctity of Marriage or 
Destroy Constitutional Democracy?, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 1487, 1491 (2005). 
239 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling:  Identity-Based Social Movements and 
Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419, 502 (2001) (“Because the women's movement did shift 
public norms to a relatively anti-discrimination baseline, it was able to do through the 
Equal Protection Clause virtually everything the ERA would have accomplished had it 
been ratified and added to the Constitution.”); see also Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, 
Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change:  The Case of the De Facto ERA:  2005–06 
Brennan Center Symposium Lecture, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1332 (2006) (explaining that even a 
failed amendment is successful). 
240 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 414 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The only 
relevant thing that has changed since Austin and McConnell is the composition of this 
Court.”). 
241 See ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY:  PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 1 (1971) (noting 
that democracy signifies “the continuing responsiveness of the government to the 
preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals”). 
242 163 U.S. 537, 543 (1896). 
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provision of public services through segregated facilities.243  This 
constitutional blessing led to the Jim Crow system of apartheid that 
prevented racial integration and perpetuated racial subjugation for 
decades.244  These policies were challenged gradually through a strategic 
litigation campaign leading up to and during the Civil Rights era, 
culminating in the 1954 decision, Brown v. Board of Education, that held 
that separate but equal was no longer a constitutionally-permissible 
excuse for racial segregation, because separate schools on the basis of 
race were unequal by definition.245 
In the early twentieth century, the Court actively struck down 
legislative efforts to improve working conditions and protect workers 
through minimum wage and maximum hour laws.246  At the time, a 
majority of justices adopted the view that the Constitution meant that 
people had a right to buy and sell their labor at whatever price they were 
able to get and that government didn’t have a constitutional role to play 
in setting ground rules for economic relationships.247  In the famous case, 
Lochner v. New York, which gave this judicial era its name, the Court 
found that this “liberty of contract” meant that New York couldn’t adopt 
a law limiting the number of hours bakers could be made to work in a 
day or week.248  But Congress and the states kept reacting to the 
untenable economic relationships that existed at the time by adopting 
economic regulations.249  After much political organizing and an open 
struggle amongst President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Congress, and 
the Court, the Court changed its mind and adopted a new understanding 
that government had the constitutional authority to regulate the 
economy through its power to protect the general welfare and the public 
                                                 
243 Id. at 542–43. 
244 See James W. Fox Jr., Doctrinal Myths and the Management of Cognitive Dissonance:  Race, 
Law, and the Supreme Court's Doctrinal Support of Jim Crow, 34 STETSON L. REV. 293, 315 
(2005) (opining that Plessy v. Ferguson was “the lynchpin for legal support for Jim Crow”). 
245 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (concluding there is no place for 
separate but equal in public education); Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory 
Minimalism, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 35 n.155 (2010) (explaining the cause of Brown v. Board of 
Education). 
246 See David E. Bernstein, Lochner v. New York:  A Centennial Retrospective, 83 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 1469, 1507–08 (2005) (describing a renaissance of Lochner during the 1920s). 
247 Id. at 1508; see also James W. Ely, Jr., The Protection of Contractual Rights:  A Tale of Two 
Constitutional Provisions, 1 N.Y.U. J. OF L. & LIB. 370, 384–86 (2005) (discussing contractual 
freedom and protection of due process). 
248 198 U.S. 45, 51 (1905). 
249 See Howard Gillman, De-Lochnerizing Lochner, 85 B.U. L. REV. 859, 859 (2005) 
(discussing the basis of Lochner in the development of sociological jurisprudence, while 
reformers were continually discouraged from fighting for protections).  But see Lochner’s 
Legacy, supra note 163, at 873 (explaining the legacy of Lochner as having been a deciding 
case for most of the influential cases regardless of their impact on governmental practices). 
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interest; suddenly, minimum wage laws and other economic regulations 
were constitutional.250  Today, the Lochner era—and the constitutional 
theory that prevented people from adopting laws necessary to order 
their society—has been discredited and has gone down as one of the 
Court’s biggest errors.251  
2. The Court’s Current Money in Politics Jurisprudence is Unstable, 
Unpopular, and Devoid of Critical Democratic Values 
Already, the Roberts Court’s money in politics jurisprudence has 
been heavily criticized by significant portions of the legal community.252  
Former Dean of the University of Chicago Law School Geoffrey Stone 
wrote “[t]hat these five justices persist in invalidating these regulations 
under a perverse and unwarranted interpretation of the First 
Amendment is, to be blunt, a travesty.  These decisions will come to be 
counted as among the worst decisions in the history of the Supreme 
Court.”253  Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg stated that “I think the biggest 
mistake this [C]ourt made is in campaign finance . . . .  It should be 
increasingly clear how [money] is corrupting our system.”254  Retired 
Justice John Paul Stevens criticized Chief Justice Roberts’ McCutcheon 
opinion, saying “[t]he voter is less important than the man who provides 
money to the candidate.  . . .  It’s really wrong.”255 
The Citizens United and McCutcheon decisions have occasioned 
strong commentary from other members of the federal judiciary.  
Leading Second Circuit Judge Guido Calabresi has written “all is not 
well with this law” because: 
The ability to express one's feelings with all the intensity 
that one has—and to be heard—is a central element of 
the right to speak freely.  It is, I believe, something that 
is so fundamental that sooner or later it is going to be 
                                                 
250 See Aaron J. Shuler, From Immutable to Existential:  Protecting Who We Are and Who We 
Want to Be with the "Equalerty" of the Substantive Due Process Clause, 12 J.L. & SOC. 
CHALLENGES 220, 240 (2010) (stating that the state had an interest in regulation, but that its 
powers were limited). 
251 See Lochner’s Legacy, supra note 163, at 874 (opining that Lochner was wrong). 
252 See Maria Coyle, Ginsburg on Rulings, Race, NAT’L L.J. (Aug. 22, 2014), 
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/printerfriendly/id=1202667692557, archived at 
http://perma.cc/3AQF-MJVJ (discussing the challenging of the disparate-impact theory). 
253 Stone, supra note 195. 
254 Coyle, supra note 252. 
255 Adam Liptak, Justice Stevens Suggests Solution for ‘Giant Step in the Wrong Direction’, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2014), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/22/us/politics/ 
justice-stevenss-prescription-for-giant-step-in-wrong-direction.html?_r=2&assetType=nyt_ 
now, archived at http://perma.cc/U453-XBK6. 
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recognized.  Whether this will happen through a 
constitutional amendment or through changes in 
Supreme Court doctrine, I do not know.  But it will 
happen.  Rejection of it is as flawed as was the rejection 
of the concept of one-person-one-vote.  And just as 
constitutional law eventually came to embrace that 
concept, so too will it come to accept the importance of 
the antidistortion interest in the law of campaign 
finance.256 
In a case involving a challenge to a New York statute that limited 
total contributions by individuals to $150,000 per year, Judge Paul Crotty 
of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York criticized 
the McCutcheon decision, writing: 
One thing is certain:  large political donations do not 
inspire confidence that the government in a 
representative democracy will do the right thing.  . . .  In 
other words, he who pays the piper calls the tune. 
 
Indeed, today's reality is that the voices of “we the 
people” are too often drowned out by the few who have 
great resources.  And when the fundraising cycle slows 
(it never stops), lobbyists take over in a continuing 
attempt to gain influence over and access to elected 
officials.  This is not a left or right, liberal or conservative 
analysis, but all the points on the political spectrum are 
increasingly involved in shaping this country's political 
agenda.  In today's never-ending cycle of campaigning 
and lobbying; lobbying and campaigning, elected 
officials know where their money is coming from and 
that it must keep coming if they are to stay in office.  
Ordinary citizens recognize this; they know what is 
going on; they know they are not being included.  It 
breeds cynicism and distrust. . . . 
 
[I]nfluence bought by money is no different than a bribe, 
and as the Book of Exodus 23:8 counsels, “a bribe blinds 
the clear-sighted and is the ruin of the just man's cause.”  
But without knowing what is in a politician's or donor's 
mind, it is almost impossible to know where to draw the 
                                                 
256 Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174, 197, 201 (2d Cir. 2012) (Calabresi, J., concurring). 
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line.  Legislators are well acquainted with these dangers.  
Based on their experiences, legislators have drawn the 
line by crafting contribution limitations like those 
contained in New York Election Laws §§ 14–114(8) and 
14–126.257 
Judge Richard Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit offered a more personal critique.258  After describing 
Chief Justice Roberts’ view of corruption and elected officials’ 
responsiveness to donors, Posner asked, “[c]an so naive-seeming a 
conception of the political process reflect the actual beliefs of the 
intellectually sophisticated chief justice?”259  Judge Posner then 
answered: 
Maybe so, but one is entitled to be skeptical.  Obviously, 
wealthy businessmen and large corporations often make 
substantial political contributions in the hope (often 
fulfilled) that by doing so they will be buying the 
support of politicians for policies that yield financial 
benefits to the donors.  The legislator who does not 
honor the implicit deal is unlikely to receive similar 
donations in the future.  By honoring the deal he is not 
just being “responsive” to the political “views and 
concerns” of constituents; he is buying their financial 
support with currency consisting of votes for legislation 
valuable to his benefactors.  Isn’t this obviously a form of 
corruption?260 
                                                 
257 N.Y. Progress & Prot. PAC v. Walsh, 2014 WL 1641781, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 
2014); see Seaton v. Wiener, 2014 WL 2081898, at *5 (D. Minn. May 19, 2014) (“While the 
Court may not agree with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the First Amendment in 
this regard, and echoes the concerns of other courts that have addressed similar issues in 
light of McCutcheon, the Court is nonetheless bound by the decisions of the Supreme 
Court.”). 
258 See Rick Hasen, Whoa:  Judge Posner Attacks Chief Justice Roberts Truthfulness in 
Campaign Finance Case, ELECTION L. BLOG (June 25, 2014, 11:35 AM), http://electionlaw 
blog.org/?p=62770, archived at http://perma.cc/6D9Y-PLKD (critiquing Chief Justice 
Roberts’ opinion in McCutcheon). 
259 Richard A. Posner, Does Chief Justice John Roberts Show a Certain Casualness About the 
Truth?, SLATE (June 25, 2014, 1:06 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_ 
politics/the_breakfast_table/features/2014/scotus_roundup/scotus_end_of_term_is_robe
rts_casual_about_the_truth_in_the_campaign_finance.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
KG2C-3Q46. The tone of these statements has come under some criticism.  Hasen, supra 
note 258. 
260 Posner, supra note 259; Hasen, supra note 258. 
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In the cases before the Court, some of the justices themselves also have 
criticized the new framework.261  And even members of the McCutcheon 
plurality have stated that recently decided five-to-four decisions with 
vigorous dissents are entitled to less deference.262  These conditions are 
present in all of the Roberts Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence.263  
As such, it might be possible to guide an evolution in the case law that 
recognizes the constitutional value of a democracy in which money does 
not dictate the strength of one’s political voice and influence. 
One court-based avenue towards change would focus on building an 
empirical record similar to that relied upon by the McConnell Court, 
which will reveal the reality-disconnect of the legal fictions employed by 
the Roberts Court.264  Some of this work has already begun.  For 
example, the Tokaji and Strause report describes the real-world effects of 
independent campaign expenditures, which undercuts some of the 
factual assumptions made by the majority in Citizens United, particularly 
that this spending is truly independent.265  It is possible that similar 
research might call into question the McCutcheon plurality’s 
assumptions.  For example, we already have seen the development of 
joint fundraising committees that can garner six-figure checks—a 
possibility dismissed by the McCutcheon plurality as implausible. 
The Court can’t keep ignoring the reality that politics and policy 
making at all levels of government continue to be captured by the donor 
                                                 
261 See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1465 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Taken 
together with Citizens United . . . today’s decision eviscerates our Nation’s campaign finance 
laws, leaving a remnant incapable of dealing with the grave problems of democratic 
legitimacy that those laws were intended to resolve.”). 
262 See Amy L. Padden, Overruling Decisions in the Supreme Court:  The Role of a Decision's 
Vote, Age, and Subject Matter in the Application of Stare Decisis After Payne v. Tennessee, 82 
Geo. L.J. 1689, 1689 & n.2 (1994) (critiquing a new approach to stare decisis). 
263 See id. at 1712 (“If 5-4 decisions were more subject to reversal, individuals would be 
uncertain as to whether a 5-4 decision would continue to retain five votes and should be 
followed, or whether it likely would be overruled . . . .”). 
264 See Goldberg & Wright, supra note 222, at 690 (explaining that electoral competition 
might provide ammunition for spend-down provisions).  See generally L. Paige Whitaker, 
Convinced by the Record.  Showing an Appearance of Corruption:  The Supreme Court Upholds the 
Groundbreaking McCain-Feingold Campaign Finance Law, 51 FED. LAW. 26, 32 (Aug. 2004) 
(“The Supreme Court's decision in McConnell v. FEC rewarded the proponents of McCain-
Feingold for thoroughly building a record demonstrating that the former campaign finance 
system had created an appearance of corruption.  Throughout its opinion, the Court relied 
upon the evidentiary record they had established.”). 
265 See TOKAJI & STRAUSS, supra note 79, at 60–69 (reporting the effects of independent 
campaign expenditures); see also Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d 118, 132–
34, 140 (2d Cir. 2014) (discussing the impact of outside spending as a reality for 
campaigns); O'Keefe v. Schmitz, 2014 WL 1795139, at *5, *7 (E.D. Wis. May 6, 2014) (finding 
that without prearranged expenditures with the candidate, the value of expenditures is 
undermined). 
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class, particularly as those most involved in the process continue to tell 
their stories.  Regarding the experience of political campaigns in North 
Carolina after Citizens United, State Senator Floyd McKissick testified to 
the U.S. Senate that:   
Suddenly, no matter what the race was, money came 
flooding in. . . .  Overall, three quarters of all the outside 
money in state races that year were tied to one man:  Art 
Pope.  Pope and his associates poured money into 
[twenty-two] targeted races, and the candidates they 
backed won in [eighteen].  In 2012, $8.1 million in 
outside money flooded into the governor’s race—a large 
portion of which was tied to Mr. Pope.  And before he’d 
even been sworn into office, our new governor 
announced who would be writing the new state budget:  
surprise, surprise.  It was Art Pope.266 
In addition to empirical work, important conceptual progress would 
involve the Supreme Court reconsidering the assumptions that led it to 
treat money as equivalent to speech in the campaign finance context.267  
Nothing in the pre-Buckley First Amendment jurisprudence required the 
conclusion that certain uses of money are equivalent to speech.268  For 
example, the lower court in Buckley applied the O’Brien standard, which 
differentiates between expressive and non-expressive conduct.269 
The relationship between financial power and political power in a 
republic is too important to leave to unelected judges to determine 
                                                 
266 Before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing:  Examining a Constitutional 
Amendment to Restore Democracy to the American People, 113th Cong. 1–2 (June 3, 2014), 
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/06-03-14McKissickTestimony.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/G266-WPWC (statement of Floyd McKissick, Jr.). 
267 See Levinson, supra note 155, at 896 (arguing that the Court erred in equating money 
with speech). 
268 See J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution:  Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 
1019 (1976) (referencing that money does not communicate ideas); see also Nixon v. Shrink 
Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 398 (2000)  (Stevens, J., concurring) (discussing the power of 
speech and money).  The Court states: 
Money is property; it is not speech.  Speech has the power to inspire 
volunteers to perform a multitude of tasks on a campaign trail, on a 
battleground, or even on a football field.  Money, meanwhile, has the 
power to pay hired laborers to perform the same tasks.  It does not 
follow, however, that the First Amendment provides the same 
measure of protection to the use of money to accomplish such goals as 
it provides to the use of ideas to achieve the same results. 
Id. 
269 See Levinson, supra note 155, at 896 (explaining that the O’Brien framework was 
rejected in Buckley). 
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without any consideration for the public consensus about the nature of 
our democracy.  It is not enough to tinker with a jurisprudence that has 
left a few campaign finance protections constitutionally viable while 
crippling the development of comprehensive systems that can protect 
democratic self-government from the depredations of market capitalism.  
We need an understanding of the constitutional role of money in 
democracy that protects not just a few wealthy individuals and interests 
but also the people’s interests in a representative government free of the 
improper influence of concentrated wealth. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
McCutcheon is another step in the Roberts Court’s campaign to roll 
back the country’s campaign finance protections.  Just as sophisticated 
political players adapted to new circumstances in the wake of Citizens 
United, the practical impact of the McCutcheon decision is already being 
felt in the rise in joint fundraising committees.  Allowing greater use of 
concentrated wealth to impact elections and wield political power will 
exacerbate the democratic harms that are already damaging our republic 
and creating a crisis of confidence in our American democracy. 
The twin decisions of McCutcheon and Citizens United marked a 
turning point in the effort to reclaim a pro-democracy understanding of 
the Constitution, and huge bipartisan majorities have responded by 
demanding comprehensive common sense rules for the use of money in 
politics.  The Court can only stay so far out of touch for so long before 
correcting course and acknowledging that, to maintain a democratic 
republic, the people must have the power to protect politics and policy 
making from domination by the donor class. 
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